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INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Circuit's decision in Anastasoff v. United States' has generated
significant discussion of "unpublished," or more accurately, "non-precedential"
judicial opinions 2 and corresponding "no-citation" rules that limit or prohibit
citation to those opinions. 3 Most of the discussion has focused on the normative

t Copyright 2004 Amy E. Sloan. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor of Law and Co-director, Legal Skills Program, University of
Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Dionne Koller, Michael Meyerson, Richard
K. Neumann, Jr., Terrill Pollman, Suzanne Rowe, Elizabeth Samuels, and Nancy Schultz for
their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Susan B. Koonin
for providing research assistance.
1. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). In
Anastasoff, the Eighth Circuit, sua sponte, determined that its local rule permitting it
prospectively to designate opinions as non-precedential was unconstitutional. According to
the court, the rule violated Article I because the Framers of the Constitution understood the
judicial power to be limited by the requirement that courts adhere to precedent. Id. at 900-03.
2. Virtually all judicial opinions are now "published" in the sense of being publicly
available, either electronically or in print. Accordingly, the term "unpublished" opinion is a
misnomer; the more accurate term is "non-precedential" opinion. See infra notes 41-46 and
accompanying text (discussing the evolution of "unpublished" opinions to
"non-precedential" opinions).
3. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Anastasoffs
conclusion that courts are required by the Constitution to follow prior decisions);
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aspects of the practice (whether issuing non-precedential opinions is a good idea, or
at least a justifiable one) or on the constitutionality of the practice from the
standpoint of the judicial power (whether Article III requires courts to follow prior
decisions).
One important issue in the debate that has not received significant attention
concerns the means the courts have used to implement this system of designating
opinions as non-precedential. In effect, the rules governing non-precedential
opinions modify the principles of stare decisis. They give courts the discretion to
opt in or out of the traditional rule of horizontal stare decisis, which requires courts
to follow their own prior decisions. 6 The federal courts traditionally have

Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 107th Cong.
(2002) [hereinafter Hearings]; Symposium, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and "No
Citation" Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175 (2001) (collecting eleven articles on the
topic); Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. Ap. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2002) (explaining
developments in the non-precedential opinion debate); Richard B. Cappalli, The Common
Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755 (2003); David
Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The CensorialJudiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1133 (2002) (arguing that no-citation rules are unconstitutional); Thomas Healy, Stare
Decisis as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001) (arguing that the

use of non-precedential opinions is consistent with the values that animate the principle of
stare decisis); Charles R. Eloshway, Note, Say It Ain't So: Non-Precedential Opinions
Exceed the Limits of Article III Powers, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 632 (2002) (arguing that
courts lack the rulemaking power to issue non-precedential opinions).
4. See sources cited supra notes 1 & 3.

5. "Stare decisis" refers to adherence to prior precedent. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis as "[tihe doctrine of precedent, under which it is
necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation").
6. Stare decisis works in two directions, horizontally and vertically. Horizontal stare
decisis is the requirement that courts follow their own prior opinions. In the federal appellate
courts, this requirement applies within each circuit, that is, individual panels within each

circuit are bound by opinions of prior panels within the same circuit. See infra note 80 and
accompanying text. Panel decisions can only be reversed or overruled by the court sitting en
banc or by the Supreme Court. Id. Vertical stare decisis is the requirement that subordinate
courts follow the prior opinions of higher courts. The practice of issuing non-precedential
opinions also has implications for vertical stare decisis. None of the federal circuit courts'
local rules defines the weight of non-precedential opinions for district courts, and they have
taken three approaches to the citation of such opinions. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits' rules address citation of non-precedential opinions to the district courts
in the circuit. SECOND Cm. R. 0.23; FOuRTH CIR. R. 36(c); SIXTH CIR. R. 28(g); SEVENTH
CIR. R. 53; NINTH Cm. R. 36-3. The First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of
Columbia, and Federal Circuits' rules address the citation of non-precedential opinions to
the circuit courts themselves, but are otherwise unclear about whether those opinions can be
cited to district courts. FIRST CIR. R. 32.3; FrH CIR. R. 47.5; EIGHTH Cm. R. 28A(i); TENTH
Cm. R. 36.3; ELEVENTH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); FED. Cm. R. 47.6. The Third
Circuit's rule does not address parties' ability to cite non-precedential opinions, providing
only that the court itself does not ordinarily cite them. THIRD Cm. I.O.P. 5.7. Some of the
same considerations that apply to horizontal stare decisis may also apply to issues
surrounding vertical stare decisis, although the variations in circuit rules might affect that
analysis. For further discussion of the issues surrounding vertical stare decisis, see Evan H.
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established rules of precedent through the adjudicatory process.7 By contrast, they
regulate the practice of issuing and citing non-precedential opinions largely through
their local rules. 8 In addition, a new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure has been
opinions, although
proposed to eliminate the restrictions on citing non-precedential
9
it does not eliminate the practice of issuing them.
The fact that the federal appellate courts use local procedural rules to authorize
this practice raises interesting questions about how it might be changed. Of course,
the federal appellate courts could end the practice on their own by changing their
local rules. 10 This is unlikely. The federal appellate courts have placed increasing
reliance on non-precedential opinions over the past thirty years, using them as a
docket
management tool,12 and are not inclined to abandon the practice unilaterally
13
now.

Another possibility is invalidating the local rules through litigation on the
ground that they are unconstitutional. This is also an unlikely avenue for changing
the practice. With the exception of Anastasoff, the federal courts have upheld the
constitutionality of local rules regarding non-precedential opinions, 14 and even
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,46 STAN. L. REv.
817 (1994).

7. Hearings,supra note 3, at 6 (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (noting that the
courts have traditionally developed principles of stare decisis through adjudication); id. at 9

(statement of Judge Alito) (noting that courts established principles of stare decisis as part of
the common law); see also infra note 80 (citing cases from each circuit stating that it follows
the principle of horizontal stare decisis).

8. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.

10. Indeed, Judge Richard Arnold, the author of the Anastasoff opinion, tried
unsuccessfully to persuade his colleagues on the Eighth Circuit to change at least the nocitation rule. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESs 219, 225 (1999).

11. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (showing increased use of nonprecedential opinions over time). Approximately 80% of federal appellate opinions are nonprecedential. Id.
12. Although defenders of non-precedential opinions have tried to frame the issue so
that the practice is really to the benefit of litigants, the primary reason the federal appellate
courts issue non-precedential opinions is to manage their dockets. Compare Hearings,supra
note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito) (noting a variety of reasons for issuing
non-precedential opinions, including conservation of opinion-writing time for precedential
opinions, preservation of "the consistency and quality of precedential decisions," and saving
"time and money for attorneys" so that they are not required to research vast amounts of case
law and pay for more reporter volumes) with id. at 8 (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining
that the courts of appeals would find it virtually impossible to stay current with their dockets
if they produced precedential opinions in every case) and id. at 10-11 (statement of Judge
Alex Kozinski) (explaining how "difficult and time consuming" writing precedential
opinions is and concluding that Ninth Circuit judges could not devote that level of effort to
every case given the number of cases they must resolve each year).
13. Non-precedential opinions have been characterized as "essential for the survival of
the federal appellate courts." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE
SPRING 2002 MEETING 25 (April 22, 2002) (as approved Nov. 18, 2002) [hereinafter APRIL
MEETING] (statement of unnamed committee member), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules
/Minutes/appO402.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004). The federal circuit courts are not likely to
abandon a practice they consider vital to their very survival on their own.
14. Hart v. Massanari,266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001), was the first case to challenge
the Eighth Circuit's analysis. Others have followed. See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
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Anastasoff was later vacated. 15 Moreover, procedural hurdles make judicial review
difficult to obtain. In the two main cases addressing the issue, the courts raised the
validity of the local rules sua sponte,1 6 which is not a reliable avenue for obtaining
review of an issue. Additional challenges to obtaining judicial review of the local
rules include finding a case that has the right facts, is in the correct procedural
posture, and involves a litigant who has standing. 17 These obstacles are especially
daunting because, in the absence of Supreme Court review, the issue would have to
be litigated in each circuit. Obtaining Supreme Court review presents a further
challenge because the Court takes few cases and has been reluctant in the past to
18
address the permissibility of non-precedential opinions.

Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting Hart's analysis and
conclusion that local rules authorizing non-precedential opinions are valid); Schmier v.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 819, 825 (9th Cir. 2002)
(upholding dismissal of a petition for writ of mandamus to force the Ninth Circuit to permit
citation to non-precedential opinions on the ground that the petitioner lacked standing and
citing Hart for the proposition that the rules are constitutional); In re Mays, 256 B.R. 555,
558-59 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000) (allowing parties to rely on non-precedential opinions because
the local bankruptcy rules did not address the practice, but criticizing Anastasoffs
conclusion that adherence to such opinions is constitutionally required).
15. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as moot, 235
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
16. In both Anastasoff and Hart, the courts raised the issue of the constitutionality of
local rules regarding non-precedential opinions on their own. Tony Mauro, Stealth Decisions
Under Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at 6 (describing how the issue of the court's
obligation to follow a prior non-precedential opinion in Anastasoff was raised sua sponte
during oral argument); Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159 (ordering counsel who violated the Ninth
Circuit's no-citation rule to show cause why he should not be disciplined). Thus, both courts
effectively hijacked other claims to make their points, a practice which raises its own
legitimacy concerns. See generally Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A
CriticalLook at Sua Sponte Decisionsby Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REv. 245 (2002).
17. In Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 136 F. Supp. 2d
1048, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aft'd, 279 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff, a member of
the Ninth Circuit bar, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to force the Ninth Circuit to stop
enforcing its local rules regarding non-precedential opinions. The district court questioned
whether it had jurisdiction to review a rule of a higher court. Id. at 1050. The court declined
to reach that issue or the merits of the case, however, because it determined that the plaintiff
lacked standing. Id. at 1051. He had not attempted to cite a non-precedential opinion or
unsuccessfully requested that the Ninth Circuit reissue a non-precedential opinion as
precedential. Id. at 1052. To challenge the rules, a plaintiff would have to be able to show
some injury from the application of the rule, and even if that could be shown, it might be
difficult to find a plaintiff willing to pursue an action to invalidate the rules. See Gregory C.
Sisk, The Balkanizationof Appellate Justice: The Proliferationof Local Rules in the Federal
Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 54 (1997) (noting that obtaining judicial review of local
circuit rules is difficult because the rules are rarely pivotal in the outcome of a case and the
problems they create are usually resolved before the conclusion of the litigation, among
other reasons).
18. The Supreme Court has had two opportunities to consider the federal appellate
courts' authority to issue non-precedential opinions. In Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,429 U.S. 917 (1976), the Supreme Court issued a
one-sentence opinion denying a motion to file a petition for a writ of mandamus after the
Seventh Circuit struck the petitioners' citation of a non-precedential opinion. See David
Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L.
REv. 128, 142-43 (1977-78) (detailing the history of the Do-Right Auto Sales case). In
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Moreover, invalidation of the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions
through litigation may not be the best approach from a policy perspective.
Adjudication is an all-or-nothing approach. If the local rules were invalidated this
way, all previously issued non-precedential opinions, no matter when decided,
could change status and become precedential. Given the degree to which the
federal appellate courts rely on non-precedential opinions, that would be a big
change to absorb overnight.
Because local circuit rules are subordinate to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and federal statutes,' 9 another possibility is prohibiting the practice of
issuing non-precedential opinions by rule or statute. The federal courts have been
studying a national approach to this issue for over ten years. The proposed new
rule eliminating citation restrictions, although it does not expressly address the
permissibility of non-precedential opinions, is an indication
that the federal courts
21
are feeling pressure to address this issue nationally.
A rule-based or statutory approach, in contrast to litigation, potentially has
several advantages. For one thing, a national rule or statute would eliminate the
practice nationwide, whereas litigation circuit by circuit could lead to inconsistent
rules, unless and until the Supreme Court resolved any conflicts. Moreover, a rulebased or statutory solution could allow for a phase-in period or provide other
means of easing the transition away from non-precedential opinions.
This Article discusses the constitutionality of a national procedural rule or
federal statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively
designating selected opinions as non-precedential. In Part I, this Article explains
how11
the rules governing non-precedential opinions
allow federal appellate courts to
22
"opt out" of their own rules of precedent. In Part II, this Article examines the
rulemaking process, showing how the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are
promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative authority and can, therefore, regulate
only matters that Congress could regulate by statute. 23 Part III explores the
constitutional limits of Congress's ability to regulate the courts' use of precedent. It
shows that a federal statute or national rule prohibiting prospective designation of
selected opinions as non-precedential would be constitutional. As long as the
statute did not specify the weight federal appellate courts must accord to their own
opinions, it would not encroach impermissibly on the courts' Article HI judicial
24
power.

Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections,434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978), the Court
granted certiorari, but declined to discuss the validity of the Seventh Circuit's citation
restrictions.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) (providing that local rules cannot conflict with federal
statutes or national rules); FED. R. APP. P. 47(a) (repeating the language of 28 U.S.C. §
2071(a)).
20. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining the history of proposals to
address non-precedential opinions nationally).
21. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in circumstances
that has caused the federal courts to consider a national rule eliminating citation restrictions).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part 1I.
24. See infra Part III.
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I. THE LOCAL RULES AND THEIR EFFECT

A. Regulation of Non-PrecedentialOpinions Through Local ProceduralRules
Federal appellate courts authorize and regulate the practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions through their local rules and, to a lesser extent, internal
operating procedures. 25 The practice has two components: rules defining when

25. FIRST CIR. R. 32.3 (permitting, but disfavoring, citation to non-precedential
opinions for persuasive value), 36 (authorizing non-precedential opinions and establishing
criteria for determining whether opinions will be precedential or non-precedential); SECOND
CIR. R. 0.23 (authorizing non-precedential opinions and prohibiting citation to
non-precedential opinions "before this or any other court"); THIRD CR. I.O.P. 5.2
(explaining that an "opinion... is designated as precedential ... when it has precedential or
institutional value"), 5.3 (authorizing non-precedential opinions), 5.7 (stating that the court
does not cite to non-precedential opinions because they "are not regarded as precedents that
bind the court"); FOURTH CIR. R. 36(a) (establishing criteria for issuing precedential
opinions), 36(b) (authorizing non-precedential opinions), 36(c) (permitting, but disfavoring,
citation to non-precedential opinions as persuasive authority); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5
(establishing criteria for designating opinions as precedential, defining unpublished opinions
issued before January 1, 1996, as precedent that should be cited only in related cases, and
declaring unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, not to be precedent but
permitting citation to them for persuasive value); Sixm CIR. R. 206 (establishing criteria for
issuing precedential opinions), 28(g) (permitting, but disfavoring, citation to
non-precedential opinions); SEVENTH CIR. R. 53 (authorizing non-precedential opinions,
establishing criteria for determining whether opinions will be precedential or
non-precedential, and prohibiting citation to non-precedential opinions); EIGHTH CIR. APP. I
(establishing criteria for designating opinions as precedential and prohibiting citation to
non-precedential opinions), R. 28A(i) (declaring that unpublished opinions are not precedent
and permitting citation to them for persuasive value); NINTH CIR. R. 36-1 (defining
categories of dispositions, including opinions, memoranda, and orders), 36-2 (establishing
criteria for designating opinions as precedential), 36-3 (declaring that unpublished opinions
are not binding precedent and prohibiting citation to them except in related cases, in a
request to publish the opinion, in a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc, or to
demonstrate a conflict among the court's dispositions); TENTH CIR. R. 36.1 (authorizing
disposition without published opinion in any case that "does not require application of new
points of law that would make the decision a valuable precedent"), 36.2 (stating that
appellate dispositions ordinarily will be published if the lower court or tribunal published its
disposition), 36.3 (stating that unpublished dispositions are not binding precedent and
permitting, although disfavoring, citation of non-precedential dispositions for persuasive
value); ELEVENTH CmR. R. 36-1 (establishing criteria for dispositions without opinions), 36-2
(stating that an opinion will not be published unless a majority of the panel agrees to publish
and that unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; permitting citation to unpublished
opinions as persuasive authority), 36-3 (permitting a panel to change the status of an opinion
from non-precedential to precedential); D.C. CIR. R. 36 (establishing criteria for issuing
precedential opinions, authorizing non-precedential dispositions, and permitting, but
disfavoring, motions to publish unpublished dispositions), 28(c) (prohibiting citation of
unpublished dispositions entered before January 1, 2002, "as precedent," and permitting
citation of unpublished dispositions entered after January 1, 2002, "as precedent"); FED. CR.
R. 47.6 (authorizing non-precedential opinions, prohibiting citation to non-precedential
opinions "as precedent," and permitting motions to reissue non-precedential opinions as
precedential), FED. Cm. I.O.P. 10 (establishing criteria for designating opinions as
precedential).
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decisions will be designated as precedential or non-precedential, and rules defining
when non-precedential opinions can be cited.26
To understand the impact of these rules, it is important to understand some
history.27 For over 100 years, jurists have expressed concern about the number of
appellate opinions.28 Concerns have focused on the problems that large numbers of
cases present for judges (difficulty keeping the docket current and staying informed
about the law) and litigants (difficulty researching large numbers of cases and
doctrinal inconsistency). 29 The increase in the number of appellate cases from the
1960s forward spurred action by the federal courts of appeals. 30 Notwithstanding
other justifications given, the federal appellate courts have come to rely
significantly on the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions as a way of
managing caseload.3
The modern history of the non-precedential opinion begins in 1964, when the
Judicial Conference of the United States passed a resolution providing "[tihat the
judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of
only those opinions which are of general precedential value." 32 In the early 1970s,

The Ninth Circuit's citation rule is a temporary rule. The Advisory Committee's notes
following the rule explain that the rule was first adopted on July 1, 2000, for a limited, 30month period that ended December 31, 2002. The circuit extended the rule for another 30month period running from January 1, 2003, until July 1, 2005. NINTH Cm. R. 36-3 advisory
committee's note.
26. See supra note 25.
27. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential
Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978). This was one of the first articles detailing the
history of the development of local rules permitting the federal appellate courts to designate
opinions as non-precedential. The history detailed in that article is confirmed in more recent
work, including Hearings,supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito); Martha J. Dragich,
Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish ifThey Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of
Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 757, 762 (1995); Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 207-08 (2001); Eloshway,
supra note 3, at 633-35.
28. Eloshway, supra note 3, at 633-34 (citing an address by Joseph Story, in 1 Am.
JURIST 1, 31 (1829), that expressed the view that the volume of appeals was, at that time,
overwhelming); see also John J.O'Connell, A Dissertationon Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP.
L.Q. 13, 14-15 (1949) (explaining the problem of too many appellate opinions); John B.
Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REv. 157, 158 (1915) (questioning
whether "we are ... in danger of being overwhelmed with the rapidly rising flood of case
law" and providing statistics on state and federal dispositions from 1909 to 1913).
29. See supra sources cited note 28.
30. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 27, at 1169-72.
31. Id.; see also infra note 286; Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public
Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 627 (1994) (using economic
analysis to show that judges will promulgate rules that maximize their preferences even if
the rules result in costs to litigants). Rules permitting non-precedential opinions maximize
judges' preferences for interesting cases because they allow judges to dispose of boring or
routine cases quickly, without much work.
32. U.S. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORTS 11 (1964).
The history of non-precedential opinions from 1964 forward appears in a number of sources.
See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito); Dragich, supra note 27, at
760-62; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 27, at 1169-72; Eloshway, supra note 3, at 633-
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the Judicial Conference drafted a model rule on the publication of judicial
opinions. 33 By the mid-1970s, all of the federal appellate courts had rules
establishing standards for the publication of opinions.3 4 Then, as now, each circuit
had its own rule.35 Almost as soon as the nonpublication rules came into being,
they were criticized.36 Nevertheless, the Judicial Conference concluded that the
experiment in37 unpublished opinions was successful and recommended their
continued use.
The experiment did, in fact, continue. Today, the vast majority of opinions
from the federal appellate courts are designated as non-precedential. The
percentage of opinions designated as non-precedential varies by circuit but has
increased significantly over time in all circuits.38 Nationally, approximately 80% of

35. All of these histories confirm the following timeline, as set out in Hannon, supra note 27,
at 207-08:
1964: Judicial Conference passes resolution directing federal
district and appellate courts to limit publication of opinions to those
"which are of general precedential value."

1971: Federal Judicial Center report notes widespread consensus
that too many court opinions are being published.

1972: Federal Judicial Center recommends to Judicial Conference
that each circuit review its publication policy and focus on limiting
publication. Judicial Conference requests each circuit to develop and

submit publication plans.
1973: Advisory Council for Appellate Justice's Standards for
Publication of Judicial Opinions report is published, containing Model

Rule for subsequent publication rules of United States Courts of
Appeals.
1974: Judicial Conference receives proposed publication plans from
courts of appeals.
1974-1975: Commission on Revision of Federal Court Appellate
System, operating under congressional mandate, holds hearings and
issues report. Majority recommends selective publication and no-citation
rules but withholds judgment and defers to Judicial Conference.
33. See supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. Hearings,supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Judge Alito); Dragich, supra note 27, at
761; see supra note 32. Practices for issuing non-precedential opinions also vary among the
circuits. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE FALL 2002 MEETING
36 (Nov. 18, 2002) (as approved May 15, 2003) [hereinafter NOVEMBER MEETING]
(summary of comments of an unnamed committee member), at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/ app1 102.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
36. One of the earliest critiques of non-precedential opinions came in 1978, only a few
years after all of the circuits promulgated rules permitting such opinions. Reynolds &
Richman, supra note 27.
37. Id. at 1172; Eloshway, supra note 3, at 634-35 & n.18.
38. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts compiles annual statistics
showing the number of non-precedential opinions issued by the federal courts of appeals.
For the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2002, the number of non-precedential
dispositions in cases terminated on the merits ranged from a low of 45.4% in the First
Circuit to a high of 91.8% in the Fourth Circuit. Table S-3, U.S. Courtsof Appeals-Types of
Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or
Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2002, at
http:l/wwwuscourts.gov/judbus2OO2/tablessO3sepO2.pdf [hereinafter Table] (last visited
Mar. 3, 2004). Although the percentage of non-precedential opinions issued by each circuit
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federal appellate dispositions are designated as non-precedential. 39 Thus, what
began as an experiment has become the dominant mode of case disposition for the
federal appellate courts.
Over time, the nature of the opinions transformed from "unpublished,"
meaning not available in print reporters, to "non-precedential," meaning not
binding on the courts. When print reporters were the sole means of accessing cases,
the two terms were synonymous. The reason for declining to publish an opinion
was to prevent parties from relying on it as precedent, an outcome dictated by the
no-citation rules. As a practical matter, few people had access to "unpublished"
opinions. If parties could not research or cite unpublished opinions, those opinions
could not bind later courts.4 °
Beginning in the late 1980s to early 1990s, "unpublished" opinions began to
become available electronically through Westlaw and LexisNexis. 41 Today,
virtually all "unpublished" opinions are available via these services. 42 In the late
1990s, courts began making these opinions available themselves via court websites;
today virtually all of the federal circuit courts make all of their opinions,
precedential or not, available via the Internet.43 All will have to shortly, under the
E-Government Act of 2002. 44

varies somewhat from year-to-year, the statistics for 1997 through 2002 show, overall, a
gradual increase in the total number of non-precedential opinions: 76.5% (1997); 74.9%
(1998); 78.1% (1999); 79.8% (2000); 80.4% (2001); 80.5% (2002). Table 1.6, U.S. Courts of
Appeals-Type of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral
Hearings or Submission on Briefs, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures

/tablel.6.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004); see also JUDITH A.

MCKENNA ET AL., FEDERAL

21
(2000) (showing decreasing percentages of "published" opinions in all of the federal circuits
from 1987 through 1998). The Advisory Committee notes accompanying proposed Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which would eliminate citation restrictions, also
acknowledge the pervasiveness of non-precedential opinions. The notes following three
preliminary versions of the proposed rule state that "[t]he thirteen courts of appeals have
cumulatively issued tens of thousands of non-precedential opinions, and about 80% of the
opinions issued by the courts of appeals in recent years have been designated as
non-precedential." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 28.
39. Table, supra note 38.
40. But see O'Connell, supra note 28, at 16 & n.5 (questioning whether a federal court,
sitting in diversity, could refuse to follow an unpublished opinion from the state whose law
controls the case and suggesting that it would be improper for the federal court to do so).
41. Hearings,supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito), 11-12 (statement of Judge
Kozinski).
42. The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits did not originally make their nonprecedential opinions available in Westlaw or LexisNexis. MCKENNA ET AL., supra note 38,
at 21. Cases from these circuits also did not appear in early volumes of West's Federal
Appendix, although now they do. See infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the
FederalAppendix). Compare 1 Fed. App. vii-xxiii (2001) (listing no cases from the 3d, 5th,
or 11th Circuits in the table of cases reported by circuit) with 57 Fed. App. xxvi, xxiii, xxx
(2003) (listing cases from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in the table of cases
reported by circuit).
43. Hearings,supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito), 11-12 (statement of Judge
Kozinski).
44. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, § 205 (2002).
JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS
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The final split between "unpublished" and non-precedential opinions came in
2001, when West launched a new print reporter, the Federal Appendix.45 The
Federal Appendix contains non-precedential opinions from all of the circuits. It
truly has become doublespeak to refer to them as "unpublished" when they appear
in print form. The terminology, therefore, has shifted from "unpublished" to
"non-precedential." 46
Presently, some courts use the "non-precedential" nomenclature, while others
continue to use the "unpublished" label.47 The effect in either case, however, is the
same. The federal appellate courts provide by local rule that they are not bound to
follow opinions that they designate (regardless of the terminology actually used) as
non-precedential. 48 The shift, therefore, is more than just a linguistic one. The
effect of the rules has also gradually changed over time. Rules that began as
regulations of the form of opinions have become rules defining the precedential
thereby altering the rule of horizontal stare decisis in the federal
value of opinions,
49
appellate courts.

The standards for determining when an opinion will be designated as
non-precedential vary among the circuits. 50 Most circuit rules create a presumption
that opinions are non-precedential unless the panel deciding the case finds that it

45. Barnett, supra note 3, at 2 (calling the publication of the Federal Appendix "a
startling action that drains the meaning from the term 'unpublished' opinion").
46. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Judge Alito) (calling the term
"unpublished opinion" "somewhat misleading" and explaining that virtually all opinions
"are published in any sense of the word" because they are available in print form, electronic
form, or both). In one sense, the outcome of this shift is ironic. In theory, making the courts'
opinions available should increase judicial legitimacy and accountability. Id. at 44
(statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (explaining that, by making all opinions
available electronically, the courts recognize that making "unpublished" opinions readily

accessible fosters judicial accountability). But in practice, allowing courts to designate in
advance that the majority of opinions are not binding decreases judicial accountability by
freeing judges from considering the future consequences of their decisions. It also reduces
judicial legitimacy by making the decisionmaking process arbitrary, in appearance, if not in
practice. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
47. Compare, e.g., FED. CIR. R. 47.6 (referring to "precedential" and "nonprecedential"
dispositions) with FIRST CIR. R. 36 (referring to "published" and "unpublished"
dispositions).
48. Most local rules provide that non-precedential opinions are not binding, although
there is some confusion over terminology in this regard. Some rules state that
non-precedential opinions are not "precedent," while others specify that they are not
"binding precedent." Compare, e.g., EIGHTH CIR. R. 28A(i) (stating that "[unpublished
opinions] are not precedent") with TENTH CIR. R. 36.3 (stating that "unpublished orders and
judgments... are not binding precedents"). The distinction might make sense if it hinged on
whether the circuit prohibits citation or allows citation for persuasive value. That, however,
is not the case. For example, the Eighth Circuit permits citation for persuasive value, yet
simultaneously claims that unpublished decisions are "not precedent," whereas the Ninth
Circuit's temporary rule 36-3 prohibits citation for persuasive value, yet still specifies that
unpublished opinions are "not binding precedent," as opposed to not precedent at all.
Nevertheless, "[aill courts of appeals agree that unpublished opinions are not binding
precedent." Hearings,supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Judge Alto).
49. See infra Part I.B (describing the effect of the rules).
50. Hearings,supra note 3, at 57 (statement of Judge Alito) (justifying variable rules
regarding the issuance and citation of non-precedential opinions based on the differences in
caseloads and internal court procedures across the circuits).
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meets specific criteria qualifying the opinion for precedential status." A few
circuits use the converse rule, presuming that an opinion will be precedential unless
the panel designates it otherwise. 52 The criteria used to make the designation vary
among the circuits as well.53
Nevertheless, some common themes emerge. 54 Generally, opinions will be
designated as precedential when they establish, alter, affect, criticize, or question
existing rules of law; involve application of existing rules to unique factual
circumstances; address matters of public concern; create conflicts with other
circuits; or resolve conflicts among panels within the circuit. 55 Opinions that do not
meet these criteria are designated as non-precedential.

51. FOURTH CIR. R. 36(a) (providing that opinions will be published "only" if they meet
specified criteria); SIXTH CIR. R. 206 (establishing criteria for publication; opinions are
designated for publication upon the request of a panel member); SEVENTH CIR. R. 53
(providing that opinions are published only if they meet the rule's criteria because "[i]t is the
policy of the circuit to reduce the proliferation of published opinions"); EIGHTH CIR. App. I
(providing that opinions should be published if they meet specific criteria); NrNTH CiR. R.
36-2 (providing that opinions are published "only" if they meet specified criteria); TENTH
CIR. R. 36.1 (permitting disposition of cases without opinions if they do "not require
application of new points of law that would make the decision a valuable precedent"), 36.2
(specifically providing for publication only when the lower court or tribunal's disposition
has been published); ELEVENTH CiR. R. 36-2 (providing that opinions are "unpublished
unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it"). It is unclear what presumption the
District of Columbia Circuit's rule creates. The rule states that opinions are published only if
they meet specified criteria. D.C. CIR. R. 36. The rule also provides, however, that the
court's policy is "to publish opinions... that have general public interest." Id. It is unclear
whether the "general public interest" standard is a presumption in favor of or against making
opinions precedential.
52. FIRST CIR. R. 36(b) ("In general, the court thinks it desirable that opinions be
published and thus available for citation. This policy may be overcome in some situations..
• ."); SECOND CIR. R. 0.23 (providing that non-precedential dispositions are made when the
decision is unanimous and all judges on the panel believe no jurisprudential purpose would
be served by a precedential opinion); THIRD CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (providing that opinions that
appear to have value only to the trial court or the parties are designated as not precedential);
FH rH CIR. R. 47.5 (providing that opinions will be published if they meet specified criteria;
opinions are published unless each member of the panel determines that publication is not
justified); FED. CIR. R. 47.6 (designating opinions as precedential unless the panel
unanimously determines that an opinion should not be precedential). Interestingly, the First
Circuit has the strongest policy in favor of publication and had the lowest number of
non-precedential opinions in 2002 (45.4%). Table, supra note 38. Even so, almost half of its
opinions were non-precedential.
53. Compare, e.g., FOURTH CIR. R. 36(a) (providing that an opinion will be precedential
if it establishes or affects a rule of law within the circuit, involves a legal issue of continuing
public interest, criticizes existing law, contains an original historical review of a legal rule,
resolves a conflict between panels of the court, or creates a conflict with a decision in
another circuit) with TENTH CiR. R. 36.1-36.2 (providing that the court writes opinions only
in cases requiring an application of new points of law that would make the decision a
valuable precedent and publishes when the opinion below has been published).
54. Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 336-39 (2001) (noting the
general stability and consistency of non-publication rules across circuits).

55. Id. The Fourth Circuit's criteria are typical. See supra note 53.
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The no-citation rules also vary considerably in the restrictions they place on
citing non-precedential opinions. Four circuits prohibit citation to non-precedential
opinions except in proceedings related to the underlying case. 56 The other nine
permit citation of non-precedential opinions in unrelated cases as nonbinding
authority, although citation of non-precedential opinions is often "disfavored" even
where it is permitted.57
Recently, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules submitted a new
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 32.1, for public comment. Rule 32.1
would eliminate citation restrictions on non-precedential opinions. The proposed
rule provides that
[n]o prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation of
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that
have been designated as "unpublished," "not for publication,"
"non-precedential" or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is
generally imposed upon the citation of58all judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions.
It could be two years or more before the proposed national rule could go into
effect, 59 and there is no guarantee that the rule will make its way through the rest of
the process with its language intact, or indeed, at all. Nevertheless, adoption of
some national rule eliminating citation restrictions is likely for three reasons. First,
the Anastasoff opinion has generated sufficient publicity in legal circles that the
courts are hard pressed to continue to ignore the situation, especially given the First
Amendment implications of prohibiting parties from citing to the courts' own
opinions. 6° Second, although non-precedential opinions and no-citation rules have
been on the Judicial Conference's agenda for more than ten years, this is the first
time a proposal has been sent out for public comment, 61 which is another indication

56. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits prohibit citation. Stephen R.
Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC.
& PRocEss 473, 475 (2003); see supra note 25.
57. Barnett, supra note 56, at 474-75; see supra note 25. It is not clear what it means to
"disfavor" citation, nor is it clear how much of an impediment the court's disfavor is to
parties that want to cite non-precedential opinions.
58. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES

29-30 (May 22, 2003),

at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app0803.pdf [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]
(last visited Jan. 24, 2004); see also Tony Mauro, Courts Move Forward on Citation
Change, LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 2003, at 8.
59. Mauro, supra note 58, at 8.
60. Hearings, supra note 3, at 53 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (stating
that, although no-citation rules do not violate the First Amendment, they implicate First

Amendment concerns); Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 3, at 1161-66 (arguing that
no-citation rules violate the First Amendment); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes,
Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs 287, 297-315 (2001)
(arguing that no-citation rules violate the First Amendment). But see Hearings,supra note 3,
at 15 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (doubting that no-citation rules violate the First
Amendment because courts restrict the speech of lawyers in courts in a variety of ways,
including through prohibitions on making false statements, even if such speech would be
constitutionally protected outside the courtroom).

61. The federal courts began studying this issue over ten years ago:
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that pressure for action has increased. Third, while past suggestions concerning a
national rule governing non-precedential opinions have met with nearly uniform
opposition from the courts, the proposed rule has met with significantly less
opposition. 62 This is not to say that the judiciary's support for the proposed rule is
unanimous; some influential judges oppose it.63 Nevertheless, the mood has
apparently shifted enough so that it seems likely that some type of rule eliminating
citation restrictions on non-precedential opinions will eventually make its way into
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
If Rule 32.1 is adopted, it will mark the first time the national rules have
directly acknowledged the existence of non-precedential opinions. 64 Opponents of

In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that the
Judicial Conference establish an ad hoc committee to study whether
technological advances gave reason to reexamine the policy on

"unpublished" opinions. The committee did not endorse a universal
publication policy, but it noted that "non-publication policies and
non-citation rules present many problems." The [Judicial] Conference

did not act on that recommendation.
During the past decade, amendments to the rules have been

periodically proposed to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure to establish uniform procedures governing
"unpublished" opinions.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito). Aside from proposed Rule 32.1,

none of the proposals sent to the Advisory Committee has made it through the process.
NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 37-38 & n.1 (noting that a proposal from 1991 to
require the federal appellate courts to make their unpublished opinions available
electronically was removed from the Advisory Committee's study agenda in April of 1998).
62. Compare Hearings,supra note 3, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining that a
1998 survey of the chief circuit judges revealed virtually unanimous agreement that uniform
rules regarding the issuance and citation of non-precedential opinions were unnecessary)

with id. at 9 (statement of Judge Alito) (explaining that a survey conducted in response to a
2001 Justice Department proposal for a uniform, national rule eliminating citation
restrictions revealed that several courts did not object to a rule on citation, while others still
had strong reservations) and APRIL MEETING, supra note 13, at 24 (reporting that a survey of
chief judges of the circuits regarding a proposal for a national rule to eliminate citation
restrictions resulted in a "decidedly mixed response," with some judges supporting the
proposal, some opposing it, and some failing to respond).
63. Hearings, supra note 3, at 54 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (citing
Michael Boudin, Chief Judge of the First Circuit, as opposing a national rule eliminating
citation restrictions, because it would prevent each circuit from adopting procedures best
suited to their local circumstances), 65 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (stating that
abandonment of no-citation rules will exacerbate the problems of docket management in the
appellate courts because if judges know their non-precedential opinions can be cited, those
opinions will have to be more like precedential opinions).
64. The only reference to non-precedential opinions presently in the national rules
appears in Rule 35 concerning grounds for rehearing en banc. The rule states that rehearing
en banc is appropriate when a panel's decision is in conflict with an "authoritative" decision
from another circuit. FED. R. APP. P. 35. The Advisory Committee notes indicate that the
rule was amended in 1998 to refer to "authoritative" decisions rather than "published"
decisions because of the differences among the circuits regarding the treatment of
"unpublished," or non-precedential, opinions. The Advisory Committee notes following
Rule 32, regarding the form of an appendix, also refer to "published" dispositions, but in the
context of district court and agency decisions: "The rule permits inclusion not only of
documents from the record but also copies of a printed judicial or agency decision. If a
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the measure believe that it is the first step toward prohibiting non-precedential
opinions. 65 The Advisory Committee has taken pains to assure the federal judiciary
that that is not the intent of the rule. The rule says nothing about whether nonprecedential opinions are permissible 66 or whether non-precedential opinions are
binding authority, persuasive authority, or fall into some other category. 67 The
Advisory Committee notes state expressly that the rule takes no position on either
issue and affects only citation. 68 One preliminary version of the rule even contained
language authorizing non-precedential•69
opinions, although the Advisory Committee
never seriously considered that version.
Regardless of the Advisory Committee's intent, if the practical effect of the
rule is to eliminate, or at least reduce the use of, non-precedential opinions, then
that will be its effect. Opponents of the rule say that judges will have to treat nonprecedential and precedential opinions the same way if non-precedential opinions
can be cited as precedent. This effectively changes non-precedential opinions into

decision that is part of the record in the case has been published, it is helpful to provide a
copy of the published decision in place of a copy of the decision from the record." FED. R.
APP. P. 32 advisory committee's note.
65. 'Those speaking against a national rule pointed out the following: ...Many circuit
judges will view this as the first step on a path that will eventually lead to the abolition of
non-precedential opinions, which are unpopular among practitioners but essential for the
survival of the federal appellate courts." APRIL MEETING, supra note 13, at 25.
66. Mauro, supra note 58, at 8 (saying that the Advisory Committee "sidestepped...
the thornier question" of the courts' ability to designate opinions as non-precedential).
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining how courts define the weight
of non-precedential opinions by rule). But see Barnett, supra note 56, at 487-97 (analyzing
proposed Rule 32.1 and arguing that its language could be interpreted to affect the weight
that federal circuit courts accord to their non-precedential opinions).
68. The Advisory Committee describes the limited nature of the proposed rule in its
notes:
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It takes no position on whether
refusing to treat an "unpublished" opinion as binding precedent is
constitutional. It does not require any court to issue an "unpublished"
opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It does not dictate the
circumstances under which a court may choose to designate an opinion
as "unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must follow in
making that decision. It says nothing about what effect a court must give
to one of its "unpublished" opinions or to the "unpublished" opinions of
another court. The one and only issue addressed by Rule 32.1 is the
citation of judicial dispositions that have been designated as
"unpublished" or "non-precedential" by a federal or state courtwhether or not those dispositions have been published in some way or
are precedential in some sense.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 58, at 33-34 (emphasis in original).
69. Alternative A for proposed Rule 32.1 provided that "[a] court of appeals may
designate an opinion as non-precedential." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 23. One
reason this language was proposed was to reassure judges who might support a rule
eliminating citation restrictions but for the fear that the rule would be the first step toward
prohibiting non-precedential opinions. See id.
at 23-35. Another reason was that proposing a
broader rule than it would likely approve would give the Committee room for compromise
later in the process. Id. at 35. The Advisory Committee rejected this language almost
immediately, saying it did not want to pronounce by rule that such opinions are, in fact,
constitutional. Id. Thus, it does not seem that this language was ever intended to be included
in the rule, nor was it considered seriously by the Advisory Committee.
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precedential opinions. 70 It is true that, under the proposed rule, federal appellate
courts will still be able to decide cases at variance with prior non-precedential
opinions without running afoul of the principle of horizontal stare decisis. It is also
true that this will be more difficult to do when parties are permitted to cite
non-precedential opinions. As a practical matter, it may be difficult for courts to
maintain their legitimacy while rejecting prior opinions solely on the ground that
they are non-precedential, and therefore, not binding. If parties are able to cite
non-precedential opinions, courts are likely to feel constrained to distinguish or
otherwise grapple with those opinions if the courts choose not to follow them. 71
Ironically, however, contrary to the fears of its opponents, the language of the
proposed rule as submitted for public comment may have the opposite effect. By
implicitly recognizing the validity of non-precedential opinions, the proposed rule
may further entrench the practice of issuing them. As noted above, the Advisory
Committee attempts to sidestep the question of the courts' ability to issue nonprecedential opinions in the notes accompanying the proposal, which emphasize
the limited nature of the rule. Nevertheless, the notes may not overcome the
implication that the rule itself creates.
The rule is stated in the negative (no prohibition or restriction may be
imposed), but the effect is affirmatively to authorize the citation of
non-precedential opinions. The very fact that the proposed rule authorizes citation
to such opinions acts as an implicit acceptance of the practice of issuing them, if
not an endorsement of it. Although some Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
prohibit parties and courts from taking certain actions, 72 none provide procedures
for regulating impermissible practices.
By permitting citation to non-precedential opinions, the rule creates the
inference that those opinions can validly be issued. If courts were not permitted to
issue non-precedential opinions, why would a rule affirmatively permitting citation
to them exist? If, in fact, courts were not permitted to issue non-precedential
opinions, the appropriate rule
would be one eliminating those opinions, not a rule
73
permitting citation to them.

70. Judge Kozinski's view on this issue is typical: "If unpublished dispositions could be
cited as precedent, conscientious judges would have to pay much closer attention to their
precise wording. Language that might be adequate when applied to a particular case might
well be unacceptable if applied to future cases raising different fact patterns." Hearings,
supra note 3, at 13. The effect would be for judges to treat all of the opinions they write as
precedential. See id.
71. Barnett, supra note 3, at 12 (expressing the opinion that allowing citation of nonprecedential opinions will cause them to be followed more often than if they cannot be
cited).
72. See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 26(b) (prohibiting courts from extending time to file
notice of appeal); FED. R. APp. P. 47(b) (prohibiting courts from imposing sanctions for
violation of procedural requirements not contained in a statute, national rule, or local rule
unless the party has actual notice of the requirement).
73. The Advisory Committee uses an express statement to contradict the conclusion
that the rule creates by implicature. Implicature is a linguistic process people use to fill in the
implied blanks in a conversation. Take, for example, a conversation in which someone says,
"Would you like a cup of coffee?" and the response is, "Does the sun set in the west?"
Implicature is the process by which the speaker understands that the answer to the response
question (yes) is the implied answer to the question that the speaker posed. False implicature
occurs when the answer to the response question is not the truthful answer to the question
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The problem is that the Advisory Committee is attempting to use its notes to
avoid the implication of the rule. Because Advisory Committee notes are entitled to
weight in interpreting procedural rules,74 some courts
have been willing to read
76
75
limitations into federal rules based on the notes.

Others, however, have not.

Because the Advisory Committee notes do not have the same force that the rules
do, courts may not be willing to use them to create a meaning for a rule that the
language of the rule itself does not support.
The Advisory Committee's disclaimer may also be ineffective because it
cannot overcome the effect of the interplay between the proposed rule and Rule 47.
Rule 47 provides that local rules cannot contravene national rules.77 The Advisory
Committee notes to the 1995 amendments to Rule 47 state that local circuit rules
"may not bar any practice that these rules explicitly or implicitly permit. ' ' 78 When

the national rules were silent on non-precedential opinions, local rules providing
for their issuance did not contravene the national rules. Once the national rules
address the topic, however, the local and national rules must be read in concert. If
the national rules affirmatively permit the citation of non-precedential opinions,
then that must mean that their issuance does not contravene the national rules. It
would be contradictory for the national rules to prohibit the issuance of
non-precedential opinions while simultaneously authorizing the citation of them.
Accordingly, by operation of Rule 47, the implication of proposed Rule 32.1 is that
local rules authorizing the designation of opinions as non-precedential are valid.
Indeed, Rule 32.1 could operate to prohibit circuits from prohibiting nonprecedential opinions because doing so would bar a practice that Rule 32.1
implicitly permits. Of course, the proposed rule does not require the federal
appellate courts to issue non-precedential opinions; it would merely operate to
posed. Thus, if a prosecutor asks a witness, "Did you see the defendant brandish a gun?" and
the witness answers, "I was there, wasn't I?", the answer to the second question (yes) may or
may not be the truthful answer to the question posed. If it is not the truthful answer, the
witness has engaged in false implicature, even though she has not made an overtly false
statement. See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Shooting From the Lip: United States v.
Dickerson, Role [Im~morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REv. 1,
15-17 (2000). The Advisory Committee's comment does not constitute false implicature.
Rather, it appears to be an attempt to avoid the effect of principles of implicature.
74. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946).
75. E.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 108
(3d Cir. 1992) (relying in part on Advisory Committee comments limiting the permissible
scope of district court local rulemaking power to determine that the local rule at issue was
invalid).
76. E.g., Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1364-65 (1st Cir.
1995) (stating that Advisory Committee comments to federal rules "cannot change the
unambiguous language of a duly adopted federal Rule"); see also id. at 1358 n.12 ("[T]he
Comment [to a federal rule] cannot substantively change the text of the rule."). In that case,
the court determined that a limitation on local rulemaking power that appeared in a comment
but not in the rule itself could not limit the district court's rulemaking power. Id. at 1365.
77. FED. R. APP. P. 47.
78. FED. R. App. P. 47 advisory committee's notes (1995 amendment). In the case of
Rule 47, the Advisory Committee notes do not attempt to create a meaning for the rule that
is unsupported by its language, as opposed to the situation with the notes accompanying
proposed Rule 32.1, which attempt to change the meaning of the text of the rule.
Accordingly, the notes accompanying Rule 47 are entitled to weight in interpreting that
rule's meaning. See Miss. Publ'g Corp., 326 U.S. at 444 (stating that Advisory Committee
comments are entitled to weight in interpreting federal procedural rules).
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prevent those courts from prohibiting them. Moreover, if a court were to determine
that non-precedential opinions are unconstitutional, the constitutional ruling would
trump the provisions of the rule. This is not likely to become an issue unless and
until one of the federal circuits affirmatively attempts to prohibit non-precedential
opinions through its local rules or through adjudication on non-constitutional
grounds, an event that is unlikely to happen anytime soon.
At present, the local rules of the federal appellate courts authorize the issuance
of non-precedential opinions; set the criteria for determining which opinions will
be designated as non-precedential; define the weight of non-precedential opinions;
and limit, to greater or lesser degrees, parties' ability to cite non-precedential
opinions. It seems likely that proposed national Rule 32.1, which eliminates the
citation restrictions, or some version of it will be adopted. Although the proposed
rule implicitly accepts the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions, it does not
regulate the practice in any way. Thus, the local rules remain the principal
mechanism that the federal appellate courts use to manage the practice of
designating the majority of their opinions as non-precedential. These rules allow
the federal appellate courts selectively to opt out of the principles of horizontal
stare decisis, as explained in the next section.
B. The Effect of Non-PrecedentialOpinions on HorizontalStare Decisis
The federal appellate courts' local rules governing non-precedential opinions
alter the principle of horizontal stare decisis because they operate as the mirror
image of that principle. 79 Horizontal stare decisis is a rule defining prospectively
the weight of a judicial opinion and is a rule to which the federal appellate courts
say they generally adhere. That is, they are bound to follow prior opinions of earlier
panels within the circuit, with limited exceptions.80 The prerogative of overruling a

79. As explained in note 6, supra, horizontal stare decisis refers to the requirement that
courts within the same jurisdiction and at the same level adhere to their own prior decisions.
80. Every circuit follows this rule. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695,
697 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Cont'l
Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 31213 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2001);
Valentine v. Francis, 270 F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 2001); Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d 518,
522 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 2001); Hart v.
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 912
n.8 (10th Cir. 1997); Walker v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 279 F.3d 1289, 1293 (1lth Cir. 2002);
Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Brubaker Amusement Co. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Alan R.
Gilbert, Annotation, In Banc Proceedingsin Federal Courtsof Appeals, 37 A.L.R. FED. 274,
at § 5 (1978 & Supp. 2003) (collecting cases); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. City of Atoka, 6
Fed. App. 725, 730 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the scope of prior precedent for
purposes of adhering to an earlier panel decision includes not only the holding, but also the
reasoning). Union Pacific's exposition of the meaning of horizontal stare decisis would not
be binding on later Tenth Circuit panels because it comes from a non-precedential opinion.
The courts recognize an exception to the general rule when a later ruling by the
Supreme Court, the circuit court sitting en banc, or a state's courts (on questions of state
law) affects the continued validity of a prior panel decision. See, e.g., Martin, 254 F.3d at
577 (overruling of a prior panel's decision was unequivocally directed by controlling
Supreme Court precedent); United States v. Doe, 819 F.2d 206, 209 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stating that, when an earlier panel decision has been undermined by a later en banc
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prior panel's decision belongs to the court sitting en banc.8l The local rules
authorizing individual panels to declare prospectively that their opinions are not
precedential allow the federal appellate courts to sidestep this requirement and
make participation in the entire system of precedent discretionary.
To understand the relationship between the local rules and stare decisis, it is
necessary to parse the elements of rules prospectively defining the weight of a
judicial opinion. Rules defining the weight of a judicial opinion involve two
tribunals: the deciding court, which issues a decision in a case, and the applying
court, which is a later court that has to decide whether to apply the deciding court's
decision. In addition, rules defining the weight of a judicial opinion consist of two
components: a general determination of the weight of the opinion based on its
source within the court system82 and a specific determination of the weight of the
decision based on its content.8 3 These elements are common both to stare decisis
and local court rules authorizing non-precedential opinions.8

decision, a later panel is free to reexamine the earlier panel decision); Cooper v. Cent. &
Southwest Servs., 271 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that a panel must adhere to
a prior panel's interpretation of state law, unless the state's courts have changed the law
since the prior panel issued its decision).
Circuit courts also occasionally recognize ad hoc exceptions if circumstances so
warrant. See, e.g., N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (4th Cir. 1977)
(determining that the panel was not bound to follow prior precedent when disqualification of
all but one of the active circuit judges in the circuit prevented en banc review and quoting
language from the Supreme Court that "stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision"). But see Charleston v. United
States, 444 F.2d 504, 505 (9th Ci. 1971) (refusing to overrule a prior panel decision without
rehearing en banc even though such a rehearing was not possible because of the timing of

the case).
81. See supra note 80; 28 U.S.C. § 46 (2000) (providing procedures for en banc
review); FED. R. APP. P. 35 (providing additional procedures for en banc review).
82. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 576 (1987) (explaining that
rules of precedent presuppose rules regarding the status of the prior decision). "If a pure
argument from precedent is valid, the earlier decision has a status that must be respected by
a later decisionmaker, and that status is imposed by the rule of precedent independent of
other status differentials." Id.
83. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis as the
requirement that courts must follow prior decisions "when the same points arise again in
litigation"). Thus, there is a content-based aspect of stare decisis. Courts routinely
distinguish prior cases on the facts. See also Hearings,supra note 3, at 68 (letter from Alcan
Aluminum Corp.) (noting that prior decisions that are not factually analogous to a pending
case have never been binding on the court deciding the pending case); Schauer, supra note
82, at 576-79 (describing context-dependency and explaining how rules of relevance help a
decisionmaker determine whether a prior decision with status requiring respect must in fact
be applied in a later situation).
84. Michael Stokes Paulsen describes the process somewhat differently, referring to the
"information" and "disposition" (decision-altering) functions of stare decisis. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1544 (2000). Using his
terminology, the local rules give the deciding court the discretion to remove the disposition
(decision-altering) aspect of its decision by making it non-precedential. The no-citation rules
then operate to remove the information aspect of the decision by prohibiting parties from
bringing the decision to the applying court's attention. See also Hearings,supra note 3, at 52
(statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman) (discussing the informational aspect of prior
precedents, including nonbinding precedents).
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Under the principles of stare decisis, the applying court controls the
determination of the weight of a prior decision. The applying court first makes 85a
generic determination about the weight of the prior decision based on its source.
The applying court then makes a specific determination about the weight of the
prior decision based on its content. If the content of the prior decision is
sufficiently different from that of the pending case, the applying court will not be
bound to follow it. If the content of the prior decision is86sufficiently similar to the
it.
case at bar, the applying court will be bound to follow

Under the provisions of the local rules authorizing non-precedential opinions,
the process is reversed, and the control over the determination of the weight of an
opinion shifts from the applying court to the deciding court.87 The deciding court
88
first makes a specific determination about a pending case based on its content.
This content-based specific determination then becomes the basis for the deciding
court's generic determination about the weight its opinion resolving the case should
have. 89 If the content is such that the pending case is not important, interesting, or
novel, as defined by the local rules, then the decision will not be binding on future
applying courts and often cannot even be cited to them.90 If the content of the case
novel, then the decision qualifies for stare
is such that it is important, interesting, or 91
decisis treatment by later applying courts.
In practice, of course, deciding courts have always had some control over the
way their opinions were used by applying courts through control over the content

85. For example, federal appellate courts are bound to follow the decisions of earlier
panels within the circuit, but are not obligated to follow decisions from federal district
courts, other circuits, or state courts. Thus, the court must first evaluate the source of an
opinion to see whether it is one the court is obligated to follow.
86. See supra note 83.
87. The deciding court cannot control the way an applying court will characterize the
deciding court's opinion. If the opinion is binding, therefore, the deciding court will be
concerned about that future characterization; by announcing prospectively that its decision is
not binding, the deciding court relieves itself of concern over future characterizations of its
decisions. "[O]ne who worries about establishing a precedent . . . has in mind a
characterization that the future will give to today's action, some category within which
tomorrow's decisionmaker will place today's facts .... The power of precedent depends
upon some assimilation between the event at hand and some other event." Schauer, supra
note 82, at 579. Thus, goes the argument, non-precedential opinions increase efficiency by
allowing the courts to rule without the need to craft language that is most likely to result in
the future characterization that the deciding court prefers. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3,
at 14 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining that, when judges write precedential
opinions, a significant amount of the time devoted to drafting the opinion is spent making
the reasoning consistent with prior precedent and useful for the resolution of future cases).
88. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing typical criteria in local
rules for designating opinions precedential or non-precedential). These are content-based
criteria.
89. Id. If the content of the case falls within the prescribed categories, the deciding
court designates the opinion as non-precedential, thereby conferring the generic status of
non-precedential on the opinion.
90. Id. Even if the citation restrictions were eliminated, the deciding court would still be
empowered under the local rules to designate an opinion as non-precedential, which still
shifts the determination about the weight of the decision from the applying court to the
deciding court.
91. Id.
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of the opinion. That is, the deciding court could always provide so little
information (in the extreme case, a one-word disposition) that the opinion would be
of no value to the applying court. 92 The fact remains, however, that the applying
court would not ignore the deciding court's opinion on the basis of the deciding
court's prospective determination that the opinion was not binding; rather, the
applying court would determine at the specific determination step that the prior
opinion did not contain sufficient information for it to be useful to the applying
court in resolving the pending case.
From a structural perspective, the local rules process does not completely
supplant stare decisis because the deciding court can choose to give its opinion
stare decisis treatment. 93 Indeed, deciding courts could make that choice in every
case, thereby effectively circumventing the local rules and maintaining traditional
principles of stare decisis. The difference, however, is that the local rules change
the relationship between courts at the same level by shifting the control over the
determination of the weight of an opinion away from the applying court and to the
deciding court. In that sense, the local rules expressly modify stare decisis
principles by making stare decisis discretionary with the deciding court. The local
rules operate structurally to make stare decisis an "opt in" system, with the control
over whether to opt in vested in the deciding court. Moreover, with approximately
eighty percent of decisions designated as non-precedential, it is clear that the
federal appellate courts do not choose the stare decisis option in the vast majority
of cases.'
Although the local rules have both structural and practical implications, in
practice, the result in most cases is the same as it would be under traditional stare
decisis rules most of the time. That is, if an applying court agrees with the prior
decision of the deciding court, it will apply the decision. Using the principles of
stare decisis, this is the expected and normal result. With opinions designated as
non-precedential, the applying court will either state that it is persuaded by the
deciding court's opinion even though it is not bound by the opinion or it will ignore
the deciding court's opinion but reach the same result.
Even if the applying court does not agree with the deciding court, most of the
time the result will still be the same under both processes. That is, even applying
the rule of horizontal stare decisis, the applying court will often be able to
distinguish the deciding court's opinion on the facts at the specific determination
step of the process. With opinions designated as non-precedential, the applying
court need not do anything to avoid applying the deciding court's opinion; it is free
simply to ignore the deciding court's opinion by virtue of the fact that the deciding

92. See, e.g., SECOND CIR. R. 0.23 (authorizing summary dispositions); EIGHTH CIR.
APP. I (authorizing disposition without opinion).
93. Some circuit rules expressly state that the panel that decides the case also
determines whether the opinion will be precedential or non-precedential. FIRST CIR. R. 36;
SECOND CIR. R. 0.23; FOURTH CIR. R. 36(a); FIFTH CIR. R. 47.5; SIXTH Cm. R. 206;
SEVENTH CIR. R. 53; EIGHTH CIR. APP. I; ELEVENTH CiR. R. 36-2; FED. CIR. R. 47.6. Some
circuit rules do not expressly state that the deciding panel makes the determination about the
precedential status of its own opinions, but the implication from the rules is that that is the
case. See THIRD CIR. I.O.P. 5.3; NINTH CIR. R. 36-1; TENTH CIR. R. 36.1 & 36.2; D.C. CIR.
R. 36.
94. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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court designated its opinion as non-precedential, and therefore, not binding on the
applying court.
The only time the two processes render different results is when the applying
court does not agree 95 with the deciding court but is unable to distinguish the
deciding court's opinion. The situation when courts have to apply precedent with
which they do not agree is really the only time when courts actually are bound b9Y
authority as authority, that is, are constrained by a precedent because of its status.
The rest of the time, if courts are persuaded that prior decisions are correct, it does
not matter 97whether the determination is that those decisions are binding or
nonbinding.

95. Lack of agreement may even be too strong a way to describe this situation. Stare
decisis constrains decisionmaking when the applying court might (if writing on a clean slate)
choose a different rule or outcome in the pending case than it would if it were constrained by
a deciding court's prior decision, even if the applying court does not disagree with the
deciding court or believe that the deciding court's prior decision was affirmatively incorrect.
Incorrect decisions present thorny problems in relation to stare decisis, see generally Caleb
Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REv. 1 (2001),

but more at the Supreme Court level than at the circuit court level. Rehearing en banc and
appeal to the Supreme Court, although not perfect and not generally intended for error
correction, are mechanisms that can provide some check on decisionmaking at the circuit
court level.
96. Stare decisis also constrains judicial decisionmaking when judges are uncertain
about the correct answer. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and
Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 93, 95 (1989).
97. Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1003,
1005-06 (1991). As Schauer explains:
[A]n argument for obedience to authority is an argument for taking some
directive as a reason for action (or reason for decision) because of its
source rather than because of its content.
This is not to say that we do not frequently take directives seriously

because of their content. But when we do so, it is because we are
persuaded by that content rather than by its source. The notion of
content-independence is designed to reflect the difference between the
soldier who stops because a colleague has pointed out to him the
presence of a mine and the soldier who stops because a sergeant has
ordered him to do so. When the colleague says "Stop!" and no more, the
soldier's first response is likely to be "Why?," requesting a reason other
than the mere issuance of the directive for complying with its mandates.
But when the sergeant says "Stop!," any good soldier knows that the last
thing you say is "Why?"
The distinction between authority and persuasion, therefore, is
content-independent and source-based. When the source rather than the
content of a directive is a reason for taking its indications as a reason for
action, an argument from authority in the strict sense exists.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also John Harrison, The Power of Congress
Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DuKE L.J. 503, 508 (2000) ("Norms of precedent have

decisive force precisely when the court would have come out the other way had it not been
following precedent."); Hearings, supra note 3, at 51 (statement of Professor Arthur D.
Hellman) (explaining that a contrary authority on a point of law only constrains the deciding
court in the rare case when three circumstances exist: (a) the earlier panel announces a new
rule of law; (b) the statement of the new rule was essential to the outcome of the case; and
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If the result under either system is the same most of the time, why should we
care about the limited circumstances under which the results will differ? If the
federal appellate courts are going to operate using the rule of horizontal stare
decisis, the times when the applying court does not agree with a prior deciding
court is exactly when that rule should apply. The principle of stare decisis is 98
a
"basic self-governing principle" that acts as a check on arbitrary decisionmaking.
A system that permits the courts to exempt some opinions from this self-governing
mechanism allows applying courts to make arbitrary decisions because they can
ignore prior opinions on an unreasoned basis, or no basis at all. This is the very
type of arbitrary discretion that led the Framers to believe that courts should be
bound by precedent in the first instance. 99 The present system also allows deciding
courts to make arbitrary decisions
when they know their decisions will not
1°°
constrain future decisionmakers.
In addition, the present system undermines the legitimacy of the courts.' 0 ' This
would be the case even if the present system never led the federal appellate courts
actually to make any arbitrary decisions, which is an unlikely scenario under any
adjudicatory system, given human fallibility. The ease with which the present
system allows the federal appellate courts to disregard their prior opinions creates
the perception of arbitrary decisionmaking. The present system also undermines the
legitimacy of the courts by creating a conflict of interest for deciding courts. This
conflict arises because the rules allow the same court that resolves an individual
case on the merits to decide for itself the weight its decision will have for future
applying courts. Moreover, for the federal appellate courts to say they will follow
the principle of horizontal stare decisis while simultaneously employing rules that
allow them to ignore the majority of their own decisions raises legitimacy
concerns. Indeed, one could argue that it would be preferable for them expressly to
abandon the principle of horizontal stare decisis than to continue the present
system. Although that might not resolve concerns about arbitrary decisionmaking,
it would at least reflect more accurately the weight the federal appellate courts
actually accord to the majority of their opinions.

(c) adhering to the new rule in a pending case would require the court to reach a different
decision than it would otherwise reach).
98. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) ("[I]t is indisputable
that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is
entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential
system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary discretion."') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
502-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
99. "To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty
in every particular case that comes before them .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 502-03
(Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
100. Schauer, supra note 82, at 579 (explaining that the resolution of a matter is
affected by the knowledge that a future decisionmaker will make use of the precedent). In
this regard, non-precedential opinions are especially problematic in death penalty cases.
David R. Dow & Bridget T. McNeese, Invisible Executions: A Preliminary Analysis of
Publication Rates in Death Penalty Cases in Selected Jurisdictions, 8 TEX. J. ON C.L. &
C.R. 149, 151-52 (2003). When courts issue non-precedential opinions denying relief in
death penalty cases, they "can write tendentious, sloppy opinions because there is no one left
alive who has an interest in holding them up to shame." Id. at 152.
101. Healy, supra note 3, at 106 (noting that the Constitution requires a legitimate
judiciary for the government to function).
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Certainly, a system of precedent need not and should not require absolute
adherence to prior decisions. If applying courts were unyieldingly obligated to
follow prior opinions, the law would become calcified and the balance between
consistency and fairness that stare decisis seeks to achieve would tilt too far toward
the consistency side of the scale. 10 2 Any generally applicable rule of horizontal
stare decisis that the courts adopt must be flexible enough to allow for exceptions
to the rule and changes to the law in appropriate cases. But when the decision about
whether to participate in the system of precedent at all is made selectively by the
same court that issues a decision, there is a serious risk that the consistency element
will fall off the scale altogether.
The present effort to eliminate citation restrictions does not solve this problem.
Although eliminating citation restrictions can make it difficult for a panel
completely to disregard a prior non-precedential opinion that is on point with a
pending case, the panel still will be able to do so. Moreover, an opinion in conflict
with a prior non-precedential opinion may itself be non-precedential, which then
allows the next panel facing the issue to disregard both opinions and take yet a
third approach to an issue. If the third opinion is non-precedential, this compounds
the problem further. Eliminating citation restrictions, although laudable, leaves this
system intact.
Because the mechanism for making participation in the system of precedent
discretionary comes from local procedural rules, the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure seem to be a natural vehicle to consider for eliminating the mechanism
nationally. The submission of proposed Rule 32.1 for public comment shows that
national regulation is a possibility. Although that rule would affect only citation
restrictions and would not affect the issuance of non-precedential opinions, its
approval would open the door for further national regulation of the practice. In
evaluating the possibility of regulating non-precedential opinions through the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is important to consider the permissible
scope of those rules. Part II addresses that issue.
II. THE NATIONAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN EXERCISE IN DELEGATED
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Procedure in the federal courts is regulated in three ways: by federal statutes,
by national rules, and by local rules. The national rules of procedure, including the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Bankruptcy, Evidence, and
Appellate Procedure, hold a unique status in American law. Although the federal

102. A system of adherence to precedent requires some flexibility. The doctrine of stare
decisis entails tensions that make strict adherence to all prior decisions all of the time
unwise. Sometimes the goals of stability and legitimacy from adherence to prior decisions
are in conflict with the goal of accurate judicial opinions. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv.
647, 652-55 (1999); see also Macey, supra note 96, at 93 (noting that principles of stare
decisis reflect the common law's primordial tension between change and stability). Stare
decisis cannot require blind adherence to decisions that are clearly incorrect. Doing so would
undermine the courts' legitimacy, which is a principal goal of the doctrine and which
depends at least to some degree on the courts' ability to correct past erroneous decisions.
Conversely, however, if an exception to the doctrine allowed courts to reexamine all prior
precedents in every case, the exception would swallow the rule. Lee, supra, at 654.
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courts have inherent authority in the absence of congressional action to regulate
procedure, Congress also has the authority to regulate procedure and has
established a mechanism through the Rules Enabling Act for the adoption of
procedural rules. 0 3 Procedural rules promulgated by the courts and adopted
pursuant to this mechanism are subject to congressional review, and therefore, have
statutory characteristics without actually being statutes. °4 Consequently, they have
been characterized as a "quasi-judicial/statutory Frankenstein."'10 Notwithstanding
their hybrid character, national procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, are promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative authority,
and therefore, are fundamentally creatures of legislative power.l°6 When the federal
courts regulate procedure through the statutory rulemaking process, they act in a
legislative capacity and cannot promulgate national rules that exceed Congress's
legislative power.
Congress has the authority to regulate procedure in the courts as a "necessary
implication" of its power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, as well
as by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which expressly confers on
Congress the power to make laws to execute the judicial power. 10 7 Congress has
delegated this authority to the United States Supreme Court to promulgate national

103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000).

104. See infra notes 116-21, describing the statutory character of procedural rles.
Procedural rules have been analogized to administrative regulations promulgated by
executive agencies pursuant to delegated authority. Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal
Court Rulemaking Procedures,76 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 928-29 (1976). The analogy is not
perfect, however, because, unlike executive agencies that have no power to act beyond what
is delegated to them, federal courts have an independent source of power to act in Article I
of the Constitution.
105. E-mail from James G. Scott, Assistant Counsel, United States Senate, Office of the
Legislative Counsel, to Amy E. Sloan (Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with the author).
106. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
107. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (citing Wayman v. Southard,
among other sources, to establish Congress's power to regulate federal court procedure);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825) (explaining that the Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate court procedures). David Engdahl has
argued that Congress has no power by necessary implication of the Tribunals Clause because
that clause gives Congress only the power to establish lower courts, and nothing more.
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the JudicialBranch, 1999
BYU L. Rev. 75, 104-19. The Supreme Court has accepted the "necessary implication" of
the Tribunals Clause as a source of Congress's power to regulate procedure, but seems to
construe its scope as co-extensive with that of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Willy v.
Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) (upholding district court's imposition of Rule 11
sanctions in a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by saying that the Tribunals Clause,
"Article I, § 8, cl. 9, authorizes Congress to establish the lower federal courts. From almost
the founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that Congress, acting
pursuant to its authority to make all laws 'necessary and proper' to their establishment, also
may enact laws regulating the conduct of those courts and the means by which their
judgments are enforced.") (footnote omitted); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)
(explaining that "the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing
the practice and pleading in those courts"); see also Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 198
(2001).
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procedural rules for the federal courts through the Rules Enabling Act. °0 This
delegation traces its history to the early days of the United States. 10 9 Congress first
delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court in the Judiciary Act of
1789.' ° This authority was "reaffirmed and strengthened" in legislation enacted in
1842.111 The Supreme Court failed to act on this authority, however, which led to
procedural confusion in the federal courts." 2 Accordingly, in the Conformity Act
of 1872, Congress withdrew the delegation of authority and required federal courts
to use state court procedures, "any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding...
,,1 13 The Conformity Act failed to achieve its purpose of making federal and state
court procedures uniform for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the
Constitution and federal statutes that superseded state procedural rules governed
some actions in federal court. 1 4 Thus, it was not a satisfactory solution to the
federal courts' procedural difficulties. After several unsuccessful attempts,
Congress renewed its delegation of statutory rulemaking authority to the courts in
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,' and that Act continues to govern rulemaking in
the federal courts today.
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the federal judiciary promulgates national
procedural rules. Congress then reviews the rules; unless Congress acts within a

108. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) ('TIhe Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals."). The rulemaking process has many steps. Generally, one of five
Advisory Committees appointed by the Judicial Conference considers new or amended rules.
If the Advisory Committee approves the new or amended rule, it then goes before the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, commonly known as the "Standing
Committee." If the Standing Committee approves the rule, it then goes before the Judicial
Conference. If the Judicial Conference approves the rule, it is then submitted to the Supreme
Court. If the Supreme Court approves the rule, it transmits the rule to Congress pursuant to
the Rules Enabling Act. Congress then has six months to review the rule. If Congress does
not act, the new or amended rule goes into effect. If Congress does not approve the rule, it
must act legislatively to reject, modify, or defer the rule. Thus, although the federal judiciary
is functionally responsible for promulgating the rules, its authority is "subject to the ultimate
legislative right of the Congress" to change or reject the rules. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, The
Rulemaking Process:A Summary for the Bench and Bar, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/

proceduresum.htm (last visited May 27, 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000).
109. For a comprehensive treatment of the pre-1934 history of rulemaking in the federal
courts, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015

(1982). A shorter history appears in Weinstein, supra note 104, at 916-22.
110. Weinstein, supra note 104, at 916 (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73).
111. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1040 & n.103 (citing the Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch.
188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518); accord Weinstein, supra note 104, at 919 (citing the same Act
and noting that the Act was a reaffirmation of the federal courts' delegated rulemaking
power).
112. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1039-41; see also Weinstein, supra note 104, at 91820 (noting that, although the Supreme Court made limited efforts at rulemaking in equity,
admiralty, and bankruptcy, it failed to promulgate rules of civil procedure from 1789 to
1872, when Congress withdrew delegated rulemaking authority in the Conformity Act).
113. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
114. Burbank, supra note 109, at 1040.
115. Id. at 1045-95 (detailing efforts from 1906 to 1934 to convince Congress to renew
its delegation of rulemaking authority to the courts).
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6
prescribed period of time, the rules become effective as submitted to Congress,"
and they are published as part of the United States Code. 117 They are not presented
to the President for signature or veto." 8 Although Congress can amend existing' or
19
proposed rules by statute, the rules themselves are not true "statutes."
Nevertheless, because they flow from Congress's legislative power, they have the
force of statutes 120 and are valid only to the extent that they implement
congressional or legislative policy.' 2 ' The "abrogation clause" of the Rules
Enabling Act also confers statutory weight on the national procedural rules. That
clause provides that "[a]ll laws in conflict with such [national] rules shall be of no
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."'' 22 When a national rule
and a federal statute conflict, the courts apply traditional principles of statutory
interpretation to resolve the conflict, treating the national rule and statute with
equivalent force.' 2 3 Thus, national procedural rules are legislative in character. 124

116. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000).

117. In U.S.C., the rules are published with Title 28 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure)
as an Appendix. U.S.C.A. also publishes them as an Appendix to Title 28. In U.S.C.S., they
are appended to the end of the code in separate "Rules" volumes.
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (Presentment Clause).
119. Apostolic Pentecostal Church v. Colbert, 169 F.3d 409, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that procedural rules are not statutes because they are promulgated through
delegated authority and not usually affirmatively adopted by the legislature).
120. See, e.g., Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d
385, 392 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the force of
statutes); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 146 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th
Cir. 1998) (stating that procedural rules are as binding as any federal statute); United States
ex rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 1966) (explaining that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes); Am. Fed'n
of Musicians v. Stein, 213 F.2d 679, 686 (6th Cir. 1954) (stating that federal procedural rules
have the force and effect of statutes); Wilkes v. United States, 192 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir.
1951) (explaining that legislative authorization and approval give procedural rules the force
and effect of statutes).
121. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1940); 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE I 1.04[l][c] (3d ed. 2003).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2002) (resolving
conflict between FED. R. App. P. 4 and an earlier federal statute by applying traditional
principles of statutory interpretation because the court viewed the rule to be the same as a
federal statute); United States v. Kim, 298 F.3d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the same
conflict and giving effect to the later-enacted rule because "[tihe rule trumps the statute"),
modified in other respects by 317 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2003).
124. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10 (explaining, in the context of upholding FED. R. CIv. P.

35 and 37, that "Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts
authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the United
States") (citation omitted); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965) (acknowledging that
the Rules Enabling Act delegated congressional rulemaking authority to the courts); see also
Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 107 n.1 (3d Cir.
1992) (construing a local district court rule as beyond the court's rulemaking power and
noting that "the federal courts have recognized that rulemaking authority is ultimately a
legislative power residing in Congress, although delegated in large measure to the courts")
(internal citation omitted). Although Sibbach and Hanna concerned the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are also promulgated pursuant to
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One question the statutory mechanism raises is the degree to which courts
retain independent, inherent' 25 authority to regulate procedure. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the federal courts have the authority to regulate procedure in
the absence of congressional action.' 2 6 Thus, for example, federal courts have
inherent authority to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for lack of prosecution,27
regulate admission to the bar,' 28 and punish contempt even in the absence of
national rules or legislation authorizing those actions.' 29 This inherent authority has
been described as "self-executing" judicial power that courts, acting as courts, must
have to resolve cases before them.' 30 It is distinguishable from non-self-executing

delegated legislative authority under the Rules Enabling Act. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1987).
125. The courts' ability, as courts, to take the steps necessary to resolve cases before
them has been described as "inherent," "incidental," and "implied" authority. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (resolving a case that involved the scope
of a federal court's "inherent" power to sanction); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (referring to "implied powers" that courts possess "because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others"); lT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351,
1360 n.20 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that inherent powers are sometimes called "incidental"
powers). These terms all refer to the same type of power and are used interchangeably.
Sometimes courts also use the term "supervisory" to describe courts' powers to take the
steps necessary to resolve cases before them. See, e.g., Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 145
(1985) (referring to the Sixth Circuit's use of "supervisory powers" to adopt a procedural
rule); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Supervisory power [is]
). Although the terms "supervisory power" and
sometimes known as inherent power ....
"inherent power" are sometimes used interchangeably, the two types of power are somewhat
different. Inherent power refers to a court's ability to take action for itself that it deems
necessary to process litigation to a conclusion. Supervisory power refers to the power of an
appellate court to make and review procedures used by a subordinate court. Frazier v.
Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (referring to the Supreme Court's "inherent supervisory
power" to review local rules to ensure that they are "consistent with the principles of right
and justice") (internal citation omitted); Burbank, supra note 109, at 1040 n.102
("'Supervisory rulemaking' refers to the promulgation of court rules for the conduct of
proceedings in inferior courts and should be distinguished from local rulemaking, the
promulgation of court rules for the conduct of proceedings in the promulgating court.").
126. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (noting that inherent
authority is "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases");
see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-44; Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764
(1980); Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34.
127. Link, 370 U.S. at 630-3 1.
128. Frazier,482 U.S. at 645. Although the regulation of bar admission in that case was
invalidated, the Supreme Court stated that the district court's inherent authority included the
authority to regulate admission to its bar. Id.
129. Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34.
130. Holding hearings, compelling witnesses, and adjudicating claims are examples of
actions within the courts' self-executing judicial power. Engdahl, supra note 107, at 84.
Self-executing aspects of judicial power have been described as relating to "judicial
potency." Judicial potency refers to power that must necessarily inhere in the courts for them
to operate as courts and fulfill their function of deciding cases. Id. at 81-82. If a tribunal
lacked the attributes of judicial potency, it would not be a "judicial" body, at least in the way
judicial bodies have been understood in Anglo-American legal traditions. Id.
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aspects of judicial power, such as conferring jurisdiction or appointing judges,
which require action by another branch of government to be effectuated.131
Because the courts and Congress share authority for procedural rulemaking in
the federal courts, the boundary between legislative and judicial power in this
context can be difficult to delineate. Although the federal courts have inherent, or
self-executing, judicial power to regulate 3Frocedure, control over court procedures
Thus, on one end of the spectrum,
is ultimately a legislative prerogative.'
Congress's legislative authority, whether exercised directly or delegated to the
courts, can displace or limit the courts' inherent authority.1 33 This is a function both
of the Supremacy Clause, under which legislative enactments supersede judicially
made rules,134 and the Rules Enabling Act, which authorizes federal courts to adopt
rules so long as those rules do not conflict with national rules or
local procedural 35
federal statutes. 1

131. For example, Congress had the choice between vesting the judicial power in one
Supreme Court or in inferior tribunals as well; even the Supreme Court could not come into
existence without a determination regarding the number of justices it would have, the
nomination of justices by the President, and the confirmation of those justices by the Senate.
Id. Because the judicial branch was dependent on the other two branches to come into being,
its power cannot be considered completely self-executing, as the Supreme Court recognized
in 1799 when it stated that "Article 11 is non-self-executing with regard to subject matter
jurisdiction." Id. at 83 (citing Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799)
(Chase, J.)) (emphasis omitted).
132. See, e.g., Ex parte Foshee, 21 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala. 1945) (explaining that the
legislature has the power to prescribe procedural rules for the courts and that legislative
actions to regulate procedure supersede rules created by the courts); A. Leo Levin &
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1958) (noting that, although courts and
legislatures have "[flor decades, if not for centuries" shared control over judicial rulemaking,
legislatures have been "conceded ultimate authority over virtually the entire procedural
area"); Weinstein, supra note 104, at 906 ("The taproot of rulemaking power in this country
is legislative delegation, though there is also nourishment from the inherent role of a
constitutionally independent judiciary.").
133. The lower federal courts' exercise of inherent power can be limited by statute or
rule. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991); see also Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959) (noting that the Supreme Court's power to make procedural
rules exists only the absence of legislation); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 759-60 (1st
Cir. 1994) (noting that the Supreme Court has made clear the general proposition that
Congress may limit the inherent power of lower federal courts to regulate procedure by rule
or statute).
134. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 60, at 316-19
(explaining that "rules promulgated under a court's inherent power are subservient to the
supremacy of statutory or constitutional dictates" and differentiating courts' "inherent"
Article 111 power to regulate procedure from rules generated though the statutorily created
rulemaking process). For example, the Conformity Act of 1872 directed courts to use state
law procedures regarding "the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding" in
civil actions, "any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding," thereby displacing court
rules adopted pursuant to inherent authority. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat.
196, 197; see also Chisolm v. Gilmer, 299 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1936) (holding that the
Conformity Act of 1872, which directed federal courts to use state procedures, superseded a
federal district court's local rule establishing a procedure for the same action that differed
from the state procedure).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000).
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On the other end of the spectrum are aspects of procedure that the courts can
regulate, but that are beyond Congress's power, Both state and federal courts have
invalidated legislative attempts to regulate procedure in ways that intrude on the
courts' inherent judicial power, on the ground that the legislation violates principles
of separation of powers.1 36 Thus, for example, state courts have struck down
statutes requiring written opinions in every case, 137 delaying the issuance of a
mandate for thirty days, 38 attempting to control the management of the court's
docket, 39 and relieving parties of the judicially created obligation that they identify
appealable errors and issues in their briefs.140 Many of these decisions are relatively
old state court decisions, but federal decisions of more recent vintage have cited

136. See e.g., cases cited infra notes 137-40, 151; see generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77
MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993) (arguing that, although Congress has some authority to make
procedural rules for the federal courts, the courts also possess exclusive, inherent rulemaking
power over some matters).
137. Compare Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25-26 (1859) (invalidating a state
statute requiring the appellate courts to issue written opinions in all cases because courts
retain the discretion to determine whether and how to deliver their opinions) and Vaughan v.
Harp, 4 S.W. 751, 752 (Ark. 1887) (quoting Houston in invalidating a state statute requiring
the court to "deliver written opinions in all cases involving a principle of law not previously
settled by the court and reported") with State v. Gary, 247 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1978)
(adopting a rule through adjudication and pursuant to the court's inherent authority requiring
decisions to deny bail when it is requested and opposed to be in writing).
Imposing requirements regarding the manner in which courts deliver their opinions is a
common example used to illustrate impermissible legislative control over court procedures.
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (suggesting that
legislatures cannot require courts to issue written opinions); Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1590,
1591 n.154 (questioning whether Congress could forbid federal judges from writing
concurring or dissenting opinions and concluding that the power to speak the law includes
the power to decide the content and manner of delivering opinions); Levin & Amsterdam,
supra note 132, at 30 (using the requirement that courts issue written opinions in every case
as an example of legislation that interferes with the exclusive domain of the judiciary). Thus,
the fact that the West Virginia court used its inherent authority to impose such a requirement
seems to be especially persuasive for showing that courts have inherent authority to regulate
aspects of procedure that are beyond legislative control.
138. Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938) (relying on a state constitutional
provision vesting legislative power in the legislature and judicial power in the courts).
139. State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson, 69 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1946) (relying on the state
constitution's vesting clauses to invalidate a statute that permitted transfer of a matter held
under advisement for longer than ninety days to another judge); State ex rel. Watson v.
Merialdo, 268 P.2d 922 (Nev. 1954) (invalidating a statute that conditioned judges' pay on
an affirmation that no matter on the docket had been pending for longer than ninety days; the
court based the decision on the state constitution's vesting clauses, as well as a provision
prohibiting reduction of judges' salaries during their terms of office); Riglander v. Star
Constr. Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772 (App. Div. 1904) (striking down a statute giving scheduling
preference to certain types of cases), aff'd, 73 N.E. 1131 (N.Y. 1905); Atchison, Topeka &
Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 251 P. 486 (Okla. 1926) (invalidating a statute that required courts
to try certain tax cases within ten days after the defendant answered).
140. Solimito v. State, 122 N.E. 578 (Ind. 1919) (invalidating a statute removing the
requirement that the appellant present in the brief every error and exception upon which the
appeal is based). The following year, the court reaffirmed its ruling and refused to overrule
Solimito. Epstein v. State, 128 N.E. 353 (Ind. 1920).
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them for the proposition that courts retain inherent authority beyond legislative
reach. 14

Although the federal courts claim this power, the outer limit of Congress's42
power to regulate procedure has been characterized as uncharted territory.
Legislative attempts to control or limit the courts' exercise of their inherent
authority have been rare, 143 and the federal courts have been reluctant to invalidate
legislative regulations of procedure on the ground that they intrude on the courts'
exclusive authority. Thus, although the federal courts assert that they have inherent
authority beyond Congress's reach, 144 they consistently interpret procedural
legislation in ways that avoid direct conflict between legislative and judicial
power. 145 For example, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute requiring jury trials
in contempt matters to apply only to criminal contempt to avoid ruling that the
statute impermissibly encroached on the courts' inherent authority to punish
contempt. 1 6 Time limits for judicial action, which state courts have invalidated,
have also been permitted by federal courts. In upholding the time limits, the federal
courts have ruled that they retain equitable power to adjust the timetable as

141. See, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985)
(collecting sources for the proposition that courts retain inherent autonomy in some matters);
United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing State ex rel. Kostas v.
Johnson, 69 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1946); Riglander v. Star Constr. Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1905); Atcheston, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 251 P. 486 (Okla. 1926);
and other cases and assuming "without deciding that federal courts possess some measure of
administrative independence such that congressional intervention would, at some extreme
point," encroach on the courts' exclusive inherent authority).
142. E.g., United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 760 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the
question of whether the courts retain "some residuum of supervisory power" that Congress
may not regulate, "or may only be regulated up to a certain point," has not been resolved); In
re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that prior cases have not identified the
precise inherent powers that courts possess that are beyond congressional reach). This is a
question the federal courts have avoided for many years. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United
States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (acknowledging that Congress can regulate the federal courts'
inherent authority "within limits not precisely defined"); Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 442
(1875) (declining to reach the issue of how far Congress can impair the courts' inherent
powers or dictate the manner in which the courts exercise those powers).
143. United States v. Rojas, 53 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that
congressional attempts to control the judiciary's inherent authority are rare); Stone, 986 F.2d
at 901 (noting that the judiciary has core inherent powers that cannot be regulated by
Congress, but that Congress has rarely attempted to interfere with those powers).
144. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 146-47; Rojas, 53 F.3d at 1214-15 (noting that
federal courts have inherent authority beyond Congress's reach, but its exact scope is
uncertain; holding that a statute under which foreign nations certify their willingness to be
subject to U.S. drug laws did not violate those inherent powers); Eash, 757 F.2d at 562
(identifying three types of inherent judicial authority, including authority derived from
Article 11 that is so essential to judicial functioning that it is beyond legislative control).
Eash's description of the categories of inherent authority has been cited by other courts, but
the Supreme Court has not found it necessary to adopt Eash's approach. Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,47 n.12 (1991).
145. Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L.
REv. 733, 738 (1995) (characterizing the federal courts as having "largely capitulated, with
only muted objection, to Congress's conclusory fiats on rulemaking power").
146. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66-67.
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necessary, even when the statutory language has not so provided; 147 that the time
limit is merely advisory or hortatory; 148and that the time limit does not require a
decision by a particular time,49 but rather, temporarily adjusts the obligations of the
parties until the court rules.'
Although the federal courts are reluctant to invalidate procedural statutes on
the ground that they interfere with the courts' exclusive, inherent authority, the
Supreme Court has done so on rare occasions. The Court has made it clear that it
can, through adjudication, adopt procedural rules required by the Constitution, and
that Congress has no authority to amend or abrogate those rules through
legislation. 50 Further, although Congress can change substantive rules of decision
in ways that are outcome determinative, it cannot use procedure to dictate the result
in an individual case without changing the underlying substantive rule. 5 ' Thus,
although the federal courts have acceded almost completely to congressional
control over court procedures, some areas still remain exclusively within the
courts' control.
In the middle are procedural matters that Congress could, but has not,
regulated. The Supreme Court has stated that federal courts "may, within limits,
formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the

147. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Prison
Litigation Reform Act's provisions automatically staying prospective relief if the district
court does not rule within the statutory time limit by reading in equitable power to stay the
stay); United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (accepting that the
courts possess some inherent authority beyond Congress's reach, but upholding the Speedy
Trial Act's time limits because the Act contains a number of exceptions permitting the court
to extend the time, including a general authorization to extend the time for "good cause"); cf
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (rejecting the reasoning of Hadix but upholding the
statute on other grounds).
148. In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that courts have inherent
authority to control the docket, but ruling that the time limit in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act for courts of appeals to decide on successive habeas corpus
petitions does not impermissibly infringe on that authority because the time limit is
"hortatory or advisory rather than mandatory").
149. Miller, 530 U.S. 327 (upholding the Prison Litigation Reform Act's provisions
automatically staying prospective relief if the district court does not rule within the statutory
time limit on the ground that the statute imposes temporary consequences for failure to rule
within the time limit, but does not actually require a ruling within the time limit).
150. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). In that case, the Supreme Court
determined that the judicially created procedural rule to safeguard against coerced criminal
confessions adopted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), could not be superseded
by a federal statute enacted after Miranda providing a different rule. The Court explained
that, although Congress retains the ultimate authority over non-constitutional procedural
rules adopted by the judiciary, it does not have the power to modify or abrogate judicially
created procedural rules that are required by the Constitution. Id at 437.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147-48 (1871)
(determining that a statute, which provided that presidential pardons of individuals who
supported the confederacy during the Civil War could not be used to show entitlement to
return of property seized during the war, exceeded Congress's power).
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Congress."' 152 This power flows both from delegated legislative authority and
inherent authority.
The delegated legislative authority comes from the provision of the Rules
Enabling Act that empowers federal courts to promulgate local rules. 53 These rules
may be promulgated pursuant to the statutory mechanism or adopted through
adjudication. 154 It also comes from the national rules, which authorize lower federal
courts to promulgate local rules and regulate procedure in individual
55 cases in any
manner consistent with federal statutes and national and local rules.
This authority is also inherent in the courts. 15 6 For example, federal district
courts have used their inherent authority to promulgate local rules requiring
prosecutors to obtain approval from the court before serving a subpoena on an
attorney, 57
prohibiting television cameras in the courtroom,'5 and sanctioning an
59
attorney. 1

In the context of regulating procedure in individual cases, the Supreme Court
upheld a district court's imposition of sanctions that would not have been
authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 or a federal statute permitting
awards of attorneys' fees. 160 The Supreme Court determined that the rule and
statute added to, but did not displace, the district court's inherent authority to
impose sanctions in an individual case. The district court's action did not
contravene the rule or statute, and Congress did not displace the district court's
inherent authority to act in the case, because the sanctions were imposed for
conduct not addressed by the rule or statute.' 6 ' By contrast, a federal district court
lacked inherent authority to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal
because doing so was directly contradictory to a national rule.' 62 Congress's

152. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)) (ruling that the district court lacked inherent authority
to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000).
154. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 253 (1993) (explaining that FED.
R. APP. P. 47 authorizes the federal circuit courts to make procedural rules "through
rulemaking or adjudication") (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140,
145-46 (1985) (characterizing a rule adopted in a Sixth Circuit opinion, under which failure
to object to a magistrate's recommendation at the district court level results in waiver of the
right to appeal to the circuit court, as a rule of procedure adopted pursuant to the Sixth
Circuit's inherent authority).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (authorizing district courts to adopt local rules for civil
matters); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 (authorizing district courts to adopt local rules for criminal
matters); FED. R. APp. P. 47 (authorizing the circuit courts to adopt local rules for appeals).
156. See Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 60, at 319 n.l 18 (collecting cases in which
local procedural rules were upheld based on the courts' inherent authority to promulgate
them).
157. Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995). The
Third Circuit ruled the opposite way on this issue, but only because it thought the local rule
was in conflict with a national rule, not because district courts lack inherent authority to
regulate procedure. Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court of Pa., 975 F.2d 102,
108 (3d Cir. 1992).
158. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 20 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984).
159. In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1976).
160. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
161. Id. at 46-52.
162. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996).
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delegated legislative authority displaced the court's inherent authority in that
instance.
The national procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, fall on the legislative side of the spectrum because they are promulgated
pursuant to delegated legislative authority and are ultimately within Congress's
control. Congress has direct review over them. 1 63 It can add, modify, or reject rules
when the courts submit them for review,16 or in any piece of legislation. 165 Thus,
the matters subject to regulation through the national rules are limited to those
Congress could also validly regulate by statute. This limitation is not generally an
issue because most procedural matters could validly be regulated either by
Congress or the courts. It is, nevertheless, a limitation on the permissible scope of
the national rules. To permit regulation of matters exclusively within the federal
courts' inherent authority through the national rules would be tantamount to
permitting Congress to legislate matters beyond its authority. As a consequence, for
national rules adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the federal
66 courts'
inherent authority has been displaced by Congress's legislative authority. 1

163. Local rules, by contrast, are not subject to congressional review. The Rules
Enabling Act and the national rules provide that local rules cannot contravene federal
statutes or national rules, thereby limiting the permissible scope of local rules. 28 U.S.C. §
2071(a) (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 83; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57; FED. R. APP. P. 47. Local rules
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and national rules are not, however,
submitted to Congress for review. Local circuit rules are subject to review only by the
Judicial Conference, and local district rules are subject to review by the judicial conference
of the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c). All local rules, whether promulgated pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act or adopted through adjudication, are subject to review by the courts if
they are challenged through litigation. See, e.g., Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987)
(using supervisory authority to invalidate a local procedural rule promulgated pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act and FED. R. CIv. P. 83); Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,. 507 U.S.
234 (1993) (invalidating the Eleventh Circuit's local rule, adopted through adjudication and
challenged on direct appeal, which provided that fugitives returned to justice after
conviction, but before sentencing and notice of appeal, waive their right to appeal);
Whitehouse v. United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995) (invalidating in a
declaratory judgment action a local district rule requiring court approval prior to service of
subpoenas on attorneys, which was promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act and
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57).
164.28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000).
165. For example, in the USA Patriot Act, Congress amended the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 203(a)(1), 219, 115 Stat. 272, 278-80, 291
(2001) (amending FED. R. CRim. P. 6 & 41). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act included amendments to FED. R. APP. P. 22(a) concerning writs of habeas corpus. Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 103, 110 Stat. 114, 118 (1996). See also United States v. Dickerson, 530
U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any
judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the
Constitution.").
166. See supra notes 133-34 (explaining that Congress's delegated legislative authority
can displace the courts' authority to adopt procedural rules). The dissenting justices in a
1995 Supreme Court decision implicitly accepted this limitation on the permissible scope of
national procedural rules in arguing that a statute that reopened final judgments in securities
cases was constitutional. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). The dissent referred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
which permits courts to reopen final judgments, as a "statute." Id. at 256. Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg then argued that, if Rule 60(b) is constitutional, Congress must also have the
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The requirement that national procedural rules be limited to matters within
Congress's legislative power exists notwithstanding the fact that some national
rules govern matters that in the past have been considered beyond legislative
control, such as the content of appellate briefs 16 7 or the requirement that some
dispositions be issued in writing. 16' The courts' lack of objection to some aspects of
the national rules stems from the fact that the federal courts themselves submitted
those rules to Congress. If Congress attempted to change those requirements in
favor of requirements that impeded the federal courts' ability to function, such as a
requirement that all dispositions be in writing, the courts might well find that the
rules intrude on matters beyond legislative control. 169 What these examples
illustrate is that at least some aspects of "[r]ulemaking of necessity fall[] into a
blurred area where
precise separation of the powers of the independent branches is
' 70
inappropriate.'
The fact that some of the national rules fall into a gray area of shared
legislative and judicial power "does not, however, require total abandonment of the
concept [of separation of powers] in the context of rulemaking."' 17 It is true that the
federal courts have the inherent authority to regulate most aspects of procedure in
the absence of congressional action, and it is also true that the inclusion of rules
relating to matters traditionally outside of legislative control have made their way
unchallenged into national rules promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative
authority. This does not mean, however, that the federal courts are free to call upon
their inherent authority to justify national procedural rules on matters that Congress
could not legislate. Fundamentally, the national rules, like the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, must be limited to matters Congress could legislate because
they flow from delegated legislative power, not from judicial power. It may be
difficult in some instances to delineate precise boundaries between legislative and
judicial power and, for technical matters, it may not be worth the effort. Where the
boundaries can be drawn, however, they must be observed, especially in matters of

authority to reopen final judgments through the statute at issue in the case. Id. at 256-57.
This argument assumes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are statutory enactments
and that they cannot authorize actions beyond Congress's legislative power. Congress seems
to concur that rulemaking is a legislative act. Edwin J. Wesley, The Civil Justice Reform Act;
The Rules Enabling Act; The Amended FederalRules of Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule
83-What Trumps What?, 154 F.R.D. 563, 570 (1994) (identifying references in the Civil
Justice Reform Act's legislative history referring to limitations on rulemaking power
delegated to the Supreme Court and to Congress's exclusive power to enact procedural
rules). But see Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1287 ("Congress is wrong in declaring-as it
does in the legislative history to the [Civil Justice Reform] Act-that it has exclusive federal
rulemaking power.").
167. FED. R. App. P. 28 (establishing the required contents of appellate briefs).
168. FED. R. App. P. 24(a)(2) ("If the district court denies the motion [for a party to
proceed in forma pauperis], it must state its reasons in writing.").
169. See infra Part ITI.A (setting out the analysis for determining whether a statute
impermissibly interferes with the federal courts' judicial power); Hearings,supra note 3, at
16 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (suggesting that a statute requiring written opinions in
every case, struck down in Houston v. Williams, might still be unconstitutional today).
170. Weinstein, supranote 104, at 928.
171. Id.
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policy. 172 Because the national rules are statutory in character, they can validly
regulate only matters within Congress's legislative authority.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PROHIBITING NON-PRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS BY
STATUTE OR NATIONAL RULE

Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 is the first effort on the
national level to regulate the federal appellate courts' use of non-precedential
opinions. Although the proposed rule affects only citation practices, some judges
believe it is the first step toward prohibiting non-precedential opinions through the
national rules.173 Because the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are
fundamentally statutory in character, their permissible scope is co-extensive with
Congress's legislative authority to regulate court procedures. Even if Congress
were not motivated to act on its own on this issue, attempts to regulate the process
through the national rules could spur Congress to exercise its legislative power in
ways that would effectively prohibit non-precedential opinions.
For example, if a national rule prohibiting prospective designation of opinions
as non-precedential were submitted for congressional review, it could go into effect
without congressional action. The rule would only be valid, however, if Congress
could directly legislate its content. 74 Alternatively, if a national rule authorizing
the present practice were proposed, along the lines of the language to that effect in
an early version of proposed Rule 32.1,175 Congress could act legislatively to
change that rule. If Congress simply abrogated the rule in its entirety, the federal
appellate courts would revert to their present local rules governing non-precedential
opinions. Congress has been known, however, to rewrite rules submitted for
review. 176 The submission of a rule authorizing prospective designation of opinions
as non-precedential could prompt Congress to legislate a contrary rule. Moreover,
if Rule 32.1 is adopted in its present form, its implied acceptance of noncause Congress to act affirmatively to prohibit the
precedential opinions could
77
practice of issuing them. 1

172. Id. at 929-30 (suggesting that Congress refrain from adjusting technical details of
national rules submitted for its review and limit its review to basic policy issues).
173. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
174. See supra Part II.
175. Alternative A for proposed Rule 32.1 provided that "[a] court of appeals may
designate an opinion as non-precedential." NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 23. See
supra note 69 and accompanying text for discussion of this proposal. Although the Advisory
Committee has indicated that it is not inclined to propose a rule to that effect at this time, it
is possible that one could be proposed in the future.
176. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1001 (3d ed. 2002) (noting a new trend since the early 1980s in which
Congress increasingly involves itself in rulemaking and listing examples in which Congress
amended rules submitted for review and enacted procedural legislation outside of the
rulemaking review process); Mullenix, supra note 145, at 735-36 (noting that "[jiudicial
rulemaking was a truly sopoforic issue until the early 1980s, when Congress unexpectedly
began to flex its legislative muscle in the procedural rulemaking arena," resulting in "what
can only be charitably characterized as Congress's arrogant, heavy-handed usurpation of
procedural rulemaking authority in the last decade"); see also supra note 165.
177. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (explaining how proposed Rule 32.1
implicitly accepts the use of non-precedential opinions).
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Such a rule or statute raises constitutional concerns about whether it intrudes
on an aspect of procedure committed to the exclusive, inherent authority of the
courts. A rule or statute that required the federal appellate courts to give binding
weight to all of their opinions all of the time would not be constitutional because it
would interfere with their ability to interpret the law in the context of adjudicating
individual cases free from legislative control. 178 It would not be necessary,
however, for Congress to go that far.
Instead, Congress could simply remove the federal appellate courts' discretion
to opt out of their own rules of precedent. Congress could do this by prohibiting the
panels deciding cases (or individual judges or internal committees of any type)
from prospectively designating some of their own opinions as non-precedential.
This would make all opinions subject to the generally applicable rules of precedent
in force within the circuit. A statute of this type would not intrude on the federal
appellate courts' Article HI powers because it would not define the weight, if any,
that they must accord to their own prior opinions, nor would it dictate a rule of
precedent for the courts. The federal appellate court would remain free to create or
change the generally applicable rules defining the weight of prior opinions, as they
are now. All the statute would do is prevent the federal appellate courts from opting
out of whatever rules of precedent they adopt by prospectively categorizing
selected opinions in a way that takes them outside the system of precedent.
Proposed Rule 32.1, if adopted, would also invoke Congress's legislative
power because it is a national rule. Rule 32.1 does not present precisely the same
constitutional issues that a statute or rule prohibiting prospective designation of
selected opinions as non-precedential does because it addresses only citation
practices. It, too, is constitutional because it leaves control over the rules of
precedent with the courts.
Part HLI.A first explains the standards for evaluating the constitutionality of a
rule or statute prohibiting selective prospective designation of opinions as nonprecedential. Part II.B analyzes the constitutionality of such a rule or statute. Part
II.C then proceeds to analyze the constitutionality of proposed Rule 32.1. Because
the national procedural rules flow from delegated legislative authority, the use of
the term "statute" below includes both legislation and national rules.
A. The ConstitutionalFrameworkfor Analyzing Statutes and ProceduralRules
The federal courts acknowledge that regulation of court procedure is a
legislative prerogative, but Congress cannot legislate in ways that intrude on the
80
courts' judicial power without running afoul of separation of powers principles. 1

178. Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1596; see also infra Part II.B.
179. See infra Part I.B.
180. Although Congress can validly regulate court procedures in general, it would be
possible for a procedural rule to interfere with the federal courts' ability to perform their
functions to such an extent that it would violate separation of powers principles. Martin H.
Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46

MERCER L. REv. 697, 725 (1995); see generally Mullenix, supra note 136 (arguing that
separation of powers limitations prevent Congress from regulating procedure in ways that
encroach on judicial power); Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of
Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 668, 672 (1990)

(discussing how the Supreme Court has resolved separation of powers questions).
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The Constitution vests each "department" of government with its own duties and
powers.18' Each branch is limited to the performance of functions committed to it
by the Constitution, and the other branches are not permitted to intrude on those
is an accepted limitation on the
functions. This concept of separation of powers
82
actions of all three branches of government. 1
For federal legislation to be valid, therefore, it cannot exceed the legislative
authority granted to Congress by the Constitution, 83 nor can it intrude on another
branch's power. The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to enact
legislation that is necessary and proper for executing the judicial power. 184 The
Supreme Court has also said that the power to establish lower federal courts carries
with it the power to regulate their procedures, but this power must be "supported by
a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the
Constitution."' 85 Thus, although these two clauses appear to be separate sources of
legislative authority, the Supreme Court treats them as co-extensive. 8 6 Even
though the Constitution grants Congress affirmative authority to legislate court
procedures, that legislation cannot intrude on the federal courts' Article III judicial
power. The analysis of these two factors-whether the legislation is supported by
an affirmative grant of power and whether it intrudes on the federal courts' judicial
power-collapses into one in the context of procedural legislation. A procedural
statute that intrudes on the courts' Article III power would not be a "proper"
87
executory statute, and therefore, would exceed Congress's legislative authority.

181. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & III (referring to governmental branches as "departments"
and defining the respective duties and powers of each department).
182. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 342 (2000) (noting that the Constitution requires
the separation of judicial and legislative power); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)
(explaining that the Constitution divides the government into three branches "to assure, as
nearly as possible, that each Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-22 (1976) (explaining that, although the
Constitution does not require "hermetic sealing off of the three branches of government from
one another," it nonetheless established a system of separation of powers).
183. Authority for legislation must come from an enumerated power. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
405 (1819) (noting that the federal government is one of enumerated powers); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (noting that the powers of the legislature are
defined and limited).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

185. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
186. See supra note 107.

187. To be valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute must be both
necessary and proper. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. A statute is "necessary" if its means are
suitably related to its ends. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413-14. The "necessary" requirement,
therefore, has not proven to be a significant restraint on Congress. Lawson, supra note 107,
at 199.

To be "proper," legislation cannot encroach on the judiciary's Article III powers. See
generally Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993) (analyzing
the meaning of the term "proper" in the Sweeping Clause (otherwise known as the
Necessary and Proper Clause) and concluding that the clause constrains Congress's choice
of means to execute federal powers in a variety of ways, including limiting congressional
actions to those that do not usurp the constitutional powers of another branch of the federal
government); see also Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1568 (arguing that Congress could
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Accordingly, the pivotal question is whether a statute prohibiting federal appellate
courts from prospectively designating selected opinions as non-precedential
intrudes on the courts' judicial power.
In determining whether the actions of one branch intrude on powers vested in
another branch, the Supreme Court has taken two alternative approaches, the
formalist approach and the functionalist approach. 188 The formalist approach is
rule-bound and almost syllogistic.' 89 It evaluates whether the action of one branch
usurps a function that the Constitution vests in another branch. Once a function is
categorized as "legislative," "executive," or "judicial," then performance of that
function by another branch violates separation of powers, except in those instances
in which the Constitution grants authority for shared power. Under this approach,
Congress cannot legislatively usurp for itself or delegate to another branch
functions committed to the federal courts as part of their Article III judicial
power. 190
The functionalist approach evaluates whether the action of one branch impedes
another branch in the performance of its constitutional duties. This approach
accepts that complete separation of government powers is impossible. It balances
the risk that one department will become too powerful relative to the other
branches against the social goals sought to be accomplished. Under this approach,
legislation through which Congress exercises "some" judicial power is valid so
long as it does not give Congress "too much" power or unduly undermine the
courts' ability to perform their "essential" or "core" functions.191 The functionalist
approach finds support in the Madisonian view of separation of powers. According
to Madison, the Constitution permits the three branches of government to have
"partialagency in" or "control over the acts of each other."' 92 The principle of
separation of powers is subverted only "where the whole power of one department
is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department." 93 Something less than one branch's whole power, however, can be
shared by another branch. 194 The functionalist approach, therefore, balances the
allocation of power between branches.

statutorily eliminate stare decisis for the Supreme Court in abortion cases, but
acknowledging that such a statute would have to be "proper" to be valid).
188. These two approaches are described in a multitude of sources. See, e.g., Mullenix,
supra note 136, at 1290-92; Redish, supra note 180, at 709-12; Adrian Vermeule, The
JudicialPower in the State (and Federal)Courts, 2000 SuP. CT. REv. 357, 362-63.
189. Redish, supra note 180, at 709-10; Vermeule, supra note 188, at 363.
190. "The Constitution prohibits one branch from encroaching on the central
prerogatives of another." Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976) (explaining that Congress cannot transfer its legislative
power to the President or the judicial branch, nor can it take on executive or judicial power
for itself) (citing Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,406 (1928)).
191. See supra note 188. Deciding what is "too much" power and whether an action
"unduly" undermines another branch's authority can be difficult. Redish, supra note 180, at
711-12 (describing functionalist models as indeterminate); Mullenix, supra note 136, at
1293-94 (explaining that a functionalist approach requires balancing interests involved in
questions of allocation of power).
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 309 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000)
(emphasis in original).
193. Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).
194. Vermeule, supra note 188, at 363.
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The Supreme Court's opinion in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.'95 illustrates
the analysis of separation of powers conflicts between Congress and the judiciary
under both approaches. In that case, Congress passed a statute retroactively
extending the statute of limitations for certain claims under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. The effect of the statute was to reopen final judgments for some
claims that had been dismissed as untimely before Congress extended the statute of
limitations. 196 The Supreme Court invalidated the statute on separation of powers
grounds.

The majority opinion used a formalistic approach. 197 It defined the judicial
power to include the power to render dispositive judgments. 98 Because the statute
usurped the judicial function of finally resolving individual cases on the merits, it
violated separation of powers principles. 199 The majority rejected any sort of
functionalist balancing. According to the majority, "the doctrine of separation of
powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when
specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.",200 It is, therefore, a
"prophylactic device" establishing clear distinctions between legislative and
judicial power.2° 1
Justice Breyer's concurrence, by contrast, illustrates the functionalist approach.
According to Justice Breyer, if a statute risks giving too much power to Congress,
it is invalid. 202 He concluded that a statute that reopens final judgments sometimes
presents this risk, but not always. The statute at issue in Plaut presented that risk
because it applied only retroactively and only to a small, identifiable group of
people. It therefore risked singling out particular individuals for oppressive
treatment by the government 20 3 and constituted a legislative attempt "to apply, as
well as make, the law.''2°4 Thus, Justice Breyer concurred with the majority in
declaring the statute unconstitutional.
The dissenters also employed functionalist analysis, but reached the opposite
conclusion. According to the dissent, statutes that involve some commingling of
the functions of the legislative and judicial branches are permissible so long as they
aggrandizement of Congress's power or undue encroachment on
pose no danger of,205
the judiciary's power. The retroactive reopening of the judgments affected by the
longer statute of limitations did not direct the outcome in the reopened cases. It
"merely remove[d] an impediment to judicial decision on the merits," and
26
therefore, did not violate separation of powers principles. 0

195. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).

196. Id. at 212-17.
197. The Plautmajority's strongly formalist approach has been characterized as "alarm
clock formalism." This is the jurisprudential equivalent of setting an alarm clock one hour
early so that one wakes on time even if one sleeps after the alarm clock goes off. In the
separation of powers context, it refers to using overprotective rules to guard against attempts
to encroach on judicial power. Vermeule, supra note 188, at 365-66.
198. Plaut,514 U.S. at 219.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 241-42 (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 242-44.
204. Id. at 241 (emphasis in original).

205. Id. at 260 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
206. Id.
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As Plaut demonstrates, both the formalist and functionalist approaches hold
sway with various members of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has not
been consistent in its choice of approaches for resolving separation of powers
questions. 20 7 For this reason, its contemporary separation of powers jurisprudence
has been criticized as "unpredictable, ad hoc justice. ' 208 Moreover, although the
formalist and functionalist labels provide some assistance in understanding
contemporary separation of powers cases, older cases are harder to categorize and
could reasonably be justified using either approach. 2°9 Analyses of decisions in
which the Supreme Court has considered statutes affecting the judiciary illustrate
the variable approaches the Court has taken.
The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes affecting the judiciary on
separation of powers grounds in three circumstances: when the statute vests review
of judicial decisions outside of Article III courts, 2 ° attempts to direct the outcome
of an individual case on the merits, 21121or, as in Plaut, reopens final judgments.212
As discussed above, the Plaut majority used a formalist approach, but the decision
could have been justified on functionalist grounds as well, as Justice Breyer's
concurrence shows. The same is true of the other decisions invalidating legislative
encroachments on judicial power.
In Hayburn's Case,213 a statute granted to an executive officer the review of
courts' Article m decisions regarding entitlement to pensions. The Supreme Court
invalidated the statute on the ground that Congress could not delegate Article III
powers to another branch of government. Doing so usurped the courts' judicial
power. Similarly, in United States v. Klein, 214 the Supreme Court refused to give
effect to a statute directing it to treat a presidential pardon as evidence of disloyalty
barring compensation for goods confiscated during the Civil War. According to the
Court, the statute was an attempt by Congress to dictate the result in an individual
case pending before the Court, in effect directing judgment in favor of the

207. Compare, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (using formalist analysis to
strike down the legislative veto) with Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833 (1986) (rejecting formalism expressly and using a functionalist balancing test in
upholding the Commission's power to hear state law counterclaims).
208. Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1295.
209. The formalist approach is also evident in some of the state court decisions

invalidating procedural statutes. These decisions defined judicial power broadly, to include
matters related to the internal functioning of the courts, such as control over the docket or

over the content of briefs. They then concluded that legislative control of these matters
usurped the judicial function. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. The federal
courts generally have not defined the judicial power as broadly as some state courts have.
See generally Vermeule, supra note 188 (detailing the analytical approaches in state cases
addressing separation of powers questions and contrasting them with the approaches used by
the federal courts).
210. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409 (1792); see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218
(explaining that Hayburn's Case "stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review
of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch"); Miller v. French,
530 U.S. 327, 342-43 (2000) (quoting Plauton the meaning of Hayburn'sCase).
211. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
212. Plaut,514 U.S. at 218-19.
213. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409.
214. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 128.
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government, and thereby usurping the judicial function of deciding cases. 2 15 The
language in both cases sounds formalistic, referring to usurpation of functions
committed to the judiciary. It would be easy to reach the same results, however,
using functionalist analysis. Vesting review of judicial decisions in executive
officers and directing the outcome in individual cases could easily be seen as
vesting "the whole judicial power" in another branch and unduly impeding the
courts in the performance of their judicial function of resolving cases on the merits.
The Supreme Court has also upheld legislation that potentially diminished the
judicial power against separation of powers challenges. Two examples are
Mistretta v. United States2 16 and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor,2 17 both of which showcase functionalist reasoning. In Mistretta, the
Supreme Court upheld the Sentencing Reform Act, which established the United
States Sentencing Commission ("USSC"). The USSC is charged with creating
sentencing guidelines for federal crimes. The guidelines shift most of the discretion
in determining appropriate sentences from individual district court judges to the
USSC.218 The Court reasoned that this shift was constitutional because sentencing
has never been the exclusive province of the courts, but rather, has historically
resided in a "'twilight area' in which the activities of the separate Branches
merge." 219 Prior to the creation of the USSC, Congress had established by statute
the ranges of punishments for federal crimes; judges had exercised virtually
unlimited discretion in determining punishments for individual defendants within
the statutory ranges; and executive officers, through the parole process, had
determined how much of their sentences defendants actually served.220
The Court determined that the statutory scheme did not alter the balance of
power between the legislative and judicial branches to such a degree as to violate
the Constitution. 221 The USSC, although it is an independent body, is located
within the judicial branch. Because significant control over sentencing remains
with the judiciary, the USSC's activities did not diminish the courts' judicial
power. 2 22 The creation of the USSC also did not aggrandize the judicial branch by
giving the judiciary legislative power more properly belonging to Congress, nor did
it undermine the integrity of the judicial branch by involving
it in policy matters
223
better resolved by the political branches of government.
The Court also balanced the policy justifications for the creation of the USSC
against the potential effect on judicial power. One reason for the creation of the
USSC was dissatisfaction over disparities in sentences imposed on similarly
situated defendants. Earlier attempts to address this problem had not been

215. Id. The exact scope of Klein has been a subject of ongoing debate. The modem
gloss on the opinion, however, is that it stands for the proposition that Congress cannot
direct the outcome of an individual case without changing the underlying substantive law.
See, e.g., Miller, 530 U.S. at 348-49 (explaining Klein); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (explaining
Klein).
216. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
217. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
218. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-67.
219. Id. at 386.
220. Id. at 364-65.
221. Id. at 395.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 393.
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Indeed, the Court characterized the problem of sentencing disparities

as a "seemingly intractable dilemma." 225 Accordingly, any reallocation of powers
occasioned by the creation of the USSC was justified by the need to create an
expert body to undertake "the intricate task of formulating sentencing
guidelines.
In Schor, the Supreme Court determined that the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC"), an entity empowered to resolve claims of violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act, could hear state law counterclaims arising out of the
disputes the CFTC was empowered to hear. 2 27 In considering the separation of
powers challenge to having state law claims adjudicated by a non-Article III
tribunal, the Court engaged in functionalist balancing. It "declined to adopt
formalistic and unbending rules," choosing instead to "weigh[] a number of factors,
action will have on the
...with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional
'2 8
constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary. 2
The Court determined that the statutory scheme, although a departure from
Article III's requirements, did not aggrandize Congress's power or impermissibly
diminish the judiciary's power for several reasons: the CFTC is limited to hearing
state law counterclaims; it resolves cases only in a narrow substantive area of law;
its decisions are reviewable by Article III courts; and litigants retain the option of
pursuing their claims in court instead of before the CFTC.229 In reaching its
conclusion, the Supreme Court considered Congress's purpose in creating an expert
body capable of resolving specific types of claims inexpensively. 23° It also
explained that Congress could not displace the federal courts by creating a system
of non-Article III tribunals empowered to resolve all cases that Article III courts
ordinarily would resolve, but determined that the de minimis intrusion on the
judicial power occasioned by the statutory scheme in this case was justified.231
Although the use of the functionalist approach generally signals that legislative
action will be upheld against a separation of powers challenge, 232 the Supreme
Court recently upheld provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act using an
essentially formalist approach in Miller v. French.2 33 The Court considered a

224. Id. at 365-66.
225. Id. at 384.
226. Id. at 412.
227. Schor, 478 U.S. at 841.
228. Id. at 851.
229. Id. at 852-56.
230. Id. at 856.
231. Id. at 855-56.
232. Some have observed that use of the formalist approach generally results in
invalidation of the challenged action, while use of the functionalist approach generally
results in upholding the challenged action. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 136, at 1292 n.3 1.
Interestingly, in the context of challenges to legislation involving conflicts between the
federal judiciary and Congress, the Supreme Court has recently applied formalist analysis.
See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211 (1995). In the context of legislation involving cooperation (or at least not involving
conflict) between the federal judiciary and Congress, by contrast, the Supreme Court has
used functionalist analysis. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Schor,
478 U.S. at 847-48 (1986).
233. 530 U.S. 327.
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provision of the Act that automatically stays injunctions in prison litigation if a
district court does not make specific findings within the statutory time limit.
In upholding the automatic stay provision, the majority defined the judicial
power narrowly, as the power to decide individual cases finally on the merits. It
then concluded that, because the automatic stay provision is temporary, suspending
a judicial order only until the district court makes the requisite findings, it does not
usurp the judicial function of finally deciding cases on the merits.234 The 235
automatic
stay provision "does not by itself 'tell judges when, how, or what to do."'
The majority then turned to the issue of the time limit triggering the automatic
stay. The prisoners argued that placing a deadline on judicial decisionmaking
interferes with core judicial functions, a functionalist argument that the majority
rejected. The majority stated that time limits in general do not implicate the
structural concerns of separation of powers because they do not "deprive courts of
their adjudicatory role," but rather, merely "encourage[] courts to apply [new
substantive standards] promptly., 236 The majority declined to say whether a time
limit could, in theory, be so short that it would effectively usurp the courts'
adjudicatory function.237
As these cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court has used both formalist and
functionalist approaches in resolving cases involving separation of powers conflicts
between the federal judiciary and Congress. The Court's recent use of formalism in
Miller and Plaut suggests that it might be inclined toward a formalist approach in
evaluating a statute prohibiting prospective designation of selected opinions as nonprecedential. This is especially so because the statute would directly affect judicial
decisionmaking, as did the statutes at issue in those cases. Nevertheless, some of
the justices clearly adhere to functionalism; thus, the statute could be evaluated
under that approach as well. Accordingly, the next Part analyzes such a statute
using both formalist and functionalist approaches, showing that it is constitutional
under either approach.

234. Id. at 346.
235. Id. (quoting the lower court's opinions in French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 449
(7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)).
236. Id. at 349-50. The application of new substantive standards to a prior order did not
present a constitutional problem because the orders at issue provided prospective relief.
Congress does not violate separation of powers by changing the substantive standards
justifying prospective relief. Because injunctions are subject to the continuing jurisdiction of
the court, they are not the "final word" of the judicial department and are subject to revision
based on changes to the underlying substantive law. Id. at 347.
237. Id. at 350. The brevity of the time limit was an issue for the concurring justices.
They were concerned that the time limit might be so short that the automatic stay would
inevitably go into effect. Id. at 352 (Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring). If that were the
case, Congress would, for all practical purposes, have "usurp[ed] the judicial function of
determining the applicability of a general rule in particular factual circumstances." Id.
Without further fact finding on that issue, however, the concurring justices were unable to
conclude that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. The dissenters would have interpreted the
statute to avoid the constitutional question by reading in authority for courts to extend the
time if necessary. Id. at 354 (Breyer and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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B. Could Non-PrecedentialOpinions Be Prohibitedby Statute or NationalRule?

A statute 'prohibiting selective prospective designation of opinions as nonprecedential can be justified on formalist and functionalist grounds. The statute
would not usurp a judicial function, nor would it unduly diminish judicial power or
aggrandize legislative power at the expense of judicial power. Accordingly, no
matter which analytical methodology is used, the statute would be constitutional.
The analysis of the statute using either approach starts from the premise that
the federal appellate courts' practice of designating opinions as non-precedential is
constitutional. This premise is not without controversy. Adherence to precedent has
been described as "of fundamental importance to the rule of law." 238 The Supreme
Court, in its most detailed exposition of the role of stare decisis in constitutional
adjudication, stated that "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by
definition, indispensable. ' 239 Nevertheless, the Constitution clearly does not require
absolute adherence to precedent. 240 The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that
stare decisis is judicial policy, not a constitutional requirement. As recently as
2003, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis is essential
to the respect accorded to the judgments of the
241Court and to the stability of the law.
It is not, however, an inexorable command."

238. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Conm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991); see also Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
239. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 ('The Court has said often and with great emphasis that 'the
doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.' Although we have
cautioned that 'stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision,' it is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing
principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task
of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon 'an arbitrary
discretion."') (citations omitted); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (explaining
that stare decisis ensures against erratic changes in the law and protects society's expectation
that fundamental legal principles are founded on law, rather than on individual judges'
proclivities); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 50 (statement of Professor Arthur D.
Hellman) (stating that allowing courts to decide cases without regard for prior precedent
"violates basic norms of equality and indeed the rule of law").
240. See cases cited infra note 241; see also Healy, supra note 3, at 54-91 (arguing that
history supports the proposition that, even if courts generally were expected to follow
precedent, they were not expected to give precedential effect to all of their decisions).
241. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003) (invalidating Texas sodomy law
as violative of privacy rights under the Due Process Clause and overturning Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that stare decisis
is not "an inexorable command." This precise phrase appears regularly in the Supreme
Court's discussions of stare decisis. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36
(1997); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-30 (1991). Even Casey, in wiich the Court
used stare decisis to justify reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade, recognized that horizontal stare
decisis is not a constitutional mandate. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. As the Court explained in
Payne, courts cannot adhere to prior precedent in all circumstances:
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process. Adhering to precedent is usually the
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Although strict adherence to prior precedent is not constitutionally compelled,
the question of the constitutionality of prospectively designating opinions as nonprecedential has not been definitively resolved. In Anastasoff v. United States, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that issuing non-precedential opinions exceeded the
courts' Article III judicial power. 242 Some have argued that non-precedential
opinions may violate due process. 243 Others have argued that non-precedential
opinions are permissible. 244 The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
deliberately declined to address the question of the permissibility of issuing nonprecedential opinions, opting instead simply to address citation restrictions. The
Advisory Committee did so iny art because it did not want to weigh in on the
constitutionality of the practice.
Determining whether the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions is or is
not constitutional is something only the federal courts can do. The power to say
what the law is includes the power to interpret the Constitution; Congress cannot
tell the courts what the Constitution means or requires.246 The federal courts have
consistently upheld the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions. The lone
exception, Anastasoff, was vacated by the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, and the
Supreme Court has declined (so far) to address the issue.247 Thus, although sound
arguments support the conclusion that non-precedential opinions are
unconstitutional, the federal courts do not seem likely to reach that conclusion
anytime soon.
If non-precedential opinions are unconstitutional, a statute prohibiting them
would not present a constitutional problem. From a formalist perspective, the
judicial power cannot include the power to do unconstitutional acts. Thus,
Congress does not usurp the judicial power by prohibiting an unconstitutional
method of decisionmaking. From a functionalist perspective, Congress cannot

wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right. Nevertheless,
when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not
an inexorable command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827-28 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Stare decisis and the Constitution:An Essay on ConstitutionalMethodology, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 581-82 (2001) (arguing that excessive focus on the Supreme Court's
description of stare decisis as judicial policy is a mistake because the use of the term
"policy" implies only that stare decisis is a principle that can be overridden in appropriate
circumstances and because the fact that a principle is not absolute does not mean that it lacks
constitutional stature).
242. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
243. See, e.g., Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An
Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 193-95 (2001).
244. See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent
and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 397 (2001); Healy,
supra note 3.
245. See supra note 69 (explaining why the Advisory Committee took no position on
the permissibility of non-precedential opinions).
246. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (explaining that the task of
constitutional interpretation belongs to the courts).
247. See supra notes 14-18 (setting out the history of litigation on the issue of nonprecedential opinions).
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aggrandize itself or take on too much power by prohibiting the courts from using
unconstitutional means of reaching decisions. 248 Moreover, it would not be possible
for the federal courts legitimately to declare non-precedential opinions
unconstitutional and simultaneously to strike down a statute prohibiting them. For
the federal courts to conclude that the issuance of non-precedential opinions is
unconstitutional, but that they retain power beyond Congress's reach to continue to
use an unconstitutional method of decisionmaking, strains credulity. Accordingly,
if a statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively designating
selected opinions as non-precedential presents a constitutional problem at all, it
must be because the statute prohibits a practice that the federal courts may
constitutionally employ.
1. Formalist Analysis
The formalist approach posits that Congress cannot perform a judicial function
that the Constitution commits to the federal courts as part of their Article III
judicial power. A formalist analysis of the statute, therefore, turns on whether
Congress usurps a judicial function by eliminating the federal appellate courts'
ability prospectively to designate selected opinions as non-precedential. Congress
does not usurp a judicial function simply by eliminating the federal appellate
courts' ability selectively to opt out of their own rules of precedent. Accordingly,
the statute would survive constitutional scrutiny under the formalist approach.
A statute that prohibits selective prospective designation of opinions as nonprecedential does not dictate the result in an individual case, and therefore, does not
violate the principle of United States v. Klein. 249 Klein prohibits Congress from
directing the result in an individual case without changing the underlying
substantive rule. 250 A statute prohibiting selective prospective designation of
opinions as non-precedential does not direct the federal appellate courts to rule in
favor of any party in any case. 251Thus, it does not contravene Klein.
The statute also leaves the federal appellate courts free to interpret the law in
any way they see fit. Interpreting the law is unquestionably a judicial function. As
the Supreme Court said 200 years ago, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule., 252 Alexander
Hamilton's Federalist No. 78, one of the most commonly cited sources of
understanding about the scope of the judicial power, also described judges'
authority to interpret the law in the context of the need to give them lifetime tenure:

248. Gary Lawson has argued that Congress has no power to control judicial
decisionmaking, even when the courts use unconstitutional methods to decide cases.
Lawson, supra note 107, at 194-95. This argument, however, reaches too far. Taken to its
logical extreme, it would prevent Congress from prohibiting courts from deciding cases
based on coin flips or skin color. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lawson's Awesome, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 231, 232 (2001).
249. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
250. Id.
251. See supra note 215 (explaining the modem gloss on Klein).
252. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
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The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as
a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to ascertain its
meaning, as well as253
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from
the legislative body.

The power to interpret the law includes the authority to choose methods of
decisionmaking. 254 If Congress could tell the courts what process to use in
interpreting the law, it could control outcome, in effect telling the courts what the
law is. 255 "[I]t is almost silly to say that the core of the judicial power is merely the
power to reach a result, without reference to the process by which that result is
reached. Accordingly, Congress can pass substantive
laws, but it cannot tell the
' 256
courts how to identify, construe, and apply them.

253. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000). See also, e.g., Bd.of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-65 (2001)
(explaining that defining constitutional guarantees is the responsibility of the Supreme
Court, not Congress); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-24 (1997) (same). The
ability to interpret and implement the Constitution has been described as one of the
minimum requirements of judicial independence. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of
Judicial Independence, 72 S.CAL. L. REv. 315, 325-26 (1999); see also Redish, supra note
180, at 712.
254. Alexander Hamilton confirmed that the Framers understood the power to interpret
the law to include the power to choose methods of decisionmaking. He explained that
federal courts would have the power to interpret conflicting statutes, and if the statutes could
not be reconciled, to determine which statute was in force. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 49899 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000). The method for making that
determination "is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision but adopted by
themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as
interpreters of the law." Id. at 436; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
225 (1995) ("If the legislature cannot ... indirectly control the action of the courts, by
requiring of them a construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it
cannot do so directly, by... directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of
a judicial inquiry.") (quoting Thomas Cooley's 1868 treatise on constitutional law).
255. Once Congress vests authority in the federal courts to adjudicate a case, it is
prohibited by separation of powers principles from controlling the outcome of the case,
either by directing a decision for one of the parties or by excluding from the court the power
to resolve particular legal or factual questions that arise in the case. Redish, supra note 180,
at 713; see also Burbank, supra note 253, at 335-36 (decisional independence is necessary
for the resolution of ordinary cases according to the law).
256. Lawson, supra note 107, at 211. The ability of the federal courts "to interpret and
apply, rather than create, substantive legal principles in the specific context of an individual
adjudication, free from control or interference by the purely political branches of the federal
government" has been termed decisional independence. Redish, supra note 180, at 717; cf.
Plaut,514 U.S. at 218-19 ("The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter
of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary
the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior
courts in the Article I hierarchy .. ")(emphasis in original).
The power to choose decisionmaking methodologies is not absolute. Congress
legislatively controls judicial decisionmaking in a variety of ways, including through the
Federal Rules of Evidence and statutes requiring deferential standards of review for certain
agency decisions, to name just two examples. Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1583-90.
Nevertheless, Congress cannot control the way the federal courts interpret the law.
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Thus, for example, Congress cannot tell the courts that Case A means X and is
to be interpreted as such, even if Congress could enact X as the substantive rule of
decision, and it certainly could not dictate the meaning of Case A if the case
interpreted the Constitution. Congress could not control the decisionmaking
process by saying that, in statutory interpretation, courts must first look at A, then
B, and then C, which would effectively be a statute defining the weight of
authorities A, B, and C. 257 To do so would be an attempt to control the courts'
determination of cases involving statutory interpretation on the merits and would
effectively make Congress the judge in its own case on questions of statutory
interpretation. Similarly, if a statute prohibiting selective prospective designation of
opinions as non-precedential is a backdoor method of controlling the federal
courts' interpretation of the law, then it usurps a judicial function.
As long as the statute did not specify the weight, if any, that federal appellate
courts must accord to their own opinions, it would leave the courts in control of the
rules of precedent. The principles of horizontal stare decisis that the federal
appellate courts presently follow require them to treat all precedential opinions
issued by panels within the circuit as binding precedent.258 If, by statute, federal
appellate courts were prohibited from prospectively designating selected opinions
as non-precedential, all federal appellate decisions would then necessarily belong
to the precedential category. That would have the effect of
259 making all opinions
binding authority on later applying courts within the circuit.
Although this would be the effect of the statute under the presently existing
principles of horizontal stare decisis, the statute would not require that result. It
would leave the courts free to make any generally applicable rule of horizontal
stare decisis they desired. Indeed, as long as the statute merely prohibited selective
prospective designation of opinions as non-precedential, it would not require the
federal appellate courts to follow horizontal stare decisis at all. If they wanted to
adopt a rule prospectively declaring all of their opinions non-precedential, in effect
abandoning the requirement of horizontal stare decisis, they would be free to do so
under the statute as long as they determined that doing so comports with the
Constitution. 26

257. Lawson, supra note 107, at 212-13, raises a version of this hypothetical. He rejects
this type of statute, saying that the choice among decisionmaking methods, including how
much weight to give to various authorities, is inherent to the judicial power; thus,
congressional regulation of this type would not be proper. Id. at 214; see also Fallon, Jr.,
supra note 241, at 576-77 (arguing that a statute that directs courts to give less weight to
prior cases than they would under principles of stare decisis also impermissibly controls
decisionmaking because it effectively directs the court to give greater significance to other
methods of decisionmaking, such as original understanding).
258. See AMY E. SLOAN, BASic LEGAL RESEARCH: TooLs & STRATEGIES 4-6 (2d ed.
2003) (explaining differentiations among types of authority, including the difference
between binding and nonbinding authority).
259. See supra note 80.
260. See, e.g., Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 60, at 288 n.5 (questioning whether
horizontal stare decisis in the federal appellate courts is constitutionally required and
suggesting that the rule may simply be one of convenience and prudence). Abandoning
horizontal stare decisis would not eliminate the problem of arbitrary decisionmaking and
could exacerbate it. Although the statute would leave this option open for the courts, it is
unlikely that they would take it, even assuming that it would be constitutional for them to do
so. Stare decisis prevents courts from having to revisit the same issues repeatedly. Thus,
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Moreover, as long as the statute focused on prospective designation of the
precedential status of opinions, it would not force an all-or-nothing choice between
making all cases either fully binding precedent or not precedent at all. There are
gradations of precedent, some of which are entitled to greater deference than are
others. 261 A statute that prohibited selective prospective designation of opinions as
non-precedential would still permit the federal appellate courts to create different
categories or tiers of precedent. For example, Stephen Barnett has advocated the
creation of a new category of "overrulable" precedent. A panel decision designated
as "overrulable" would be binding unless and until a later panel overruled it in a
fully binding opinion. A fully binding opinion would be subject to the usual rule of
horizontal stare decisis; later panels within the circuit would be required to follow
it unless and until it was reversed or overruled by the court sitting en banc or the
Supreme Court.262 Nothing in the statute would prevent courts from adopting a
system like that.
Finally, acting as applying courts, 263 the federal appellate courts could
recognize exceptions to the rule of horizontal stare decisis as circumstances so
require, including ad hoc exceptions, as they have done in the past. 2 64 The only

thing they could not do is selectively "opt out" of their own system of precedent,
whatever that system might be, by prospectively designating selected opinions as
non-precedential and, therefore, outside of the system.
Of course, the judicial power is more than the power to reach a result. It also
includes the power to express the reasoning of a decision; the result and the
reasoning often cannot be divorced from one another. 265 Judges have argued that
the ability to designate opinions prospectively as non-precedential, while not result
despite claims that making all opinions precedential would create too much work for the
courts, eliminating horizontal stare decisis could actually create more work by requiring
courts to revisit settled issues.
261. Barnett, supra note 3, at 22-25 (identifying five categories of precedent and
suggesting that relaxation of the law of the circuit rule might give federal appellate courts
the flexibility to manage their dockets without prospectively declaring some opinions nonprecedential); see also Hearings,supra note 3, at 46-47 (statement of Professor Arthur D.
Hellman) (criticizing polarized positions under which courts must either treat nonprecedential opinions as fully binding or be free to disregard them entirely and suggesting
that more nuanced alternatives for defining precedent would be useful).
262. Barnett, supra note 3, at 22-25. Barnett uses the term "published" opinion to
describe the type of binding opinion subject to the usual rule of horizontal stare decisis. Id.
Whether Congress could, by statute or rule, establish this type of precedential system for the
federal appellate courts is questionable; so long as the rule or statute prohibiting designation
of selected opinions as non-precedential left this and other options open for the courts, it
would be constitutional.
263. A "deciding court" is a court that issues a decision. An "applying court" is a court
that has to decide whether to apply an earlier deciding court's decision. See supra text
accompanying note 82 (defining the terms "deciding court" and "applying court" for
purposes of horizontal stare decisis).
264. See supra note 80 (noting exceptions to the generally applicable rule of horizontal
stare decisis).
265. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1994) (explaining
that the judicial power is more than the power to reach a result); Union Pac. R.R. v. City of
Atoka, 6 Fed. App. 725, 730 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the scope of prior precedent
for purposes of adhering to a prior panel decision includes not only the holding, but also the
reasoning); Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1590 & n. 154 (concluding that the power to say what
the law is includes the power to choose the form of expression of an opinion).
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altering, affects the reasoning in opinions and is intimately bound up with the
development of the law. 26 6 Even so, the statute would not affect the federal
appellate courts' ability to craft opinions in the manner they see fit to communicate
the results and reasoning in the cases they decide, because it would leave them in
control of the form and content of their opinions. The statute would not require
them to write opinions of a particular length, or even to write opinions at all. They
would remain free to use summary dispositions, very short opinions, oral rulings,
or any other method of communicating their opinions. Accordingly, the federal
appellate courts would not lose their ability to fashion opinions as appropriate for
the development of the law. Indeed, as a practical matter, they could issue opinions
with so little information as to be of virtually no value to later applying courts,
which would effectively render the opinions non-precedential. Although this might
raise questions as to the wisdom of the statute, it does not affect the statute's
constitutionality.
Finally, the federal courts as an institution would remain in control of the
development of the law because the statute would not affect their ability to change
the law. 267 Even if the federal appellate courts retained the traditional rule of
horizontal stare decisis that they presently follow for precedential opinions, each
circuit would still have the same ability that it presently enjoys, sitting en banc, to
reverse or overrule its own precedents. Having to sit en banc to change panel
decisions might be inconvenient for the courts, but that does not make the statute
unconstitutional.268 The Supreme Court would also retain the ability to reverse or
overrule circuit precedent, as it does now. Accordingly, the statute would not
enshrine the present interpretations of federal law or the Constitution in a way that
would prevent
the federal courts from changing those interpretations if they wanted
2 69
to do SO.

266. In fact, judges say they join non-precedential opinions even when they do not
agree with the reasoning, such that the opinions may not actually reflect the court's
reasoning. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining
that a non-precedential opinion does not always reflect the court's actual reasoning); see also
infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
267. Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 347 (2000) (explaining that Congress can
change the substantive rules and apply them retroactively to pending cases because any
interim resolution is not the final word of the judicial department; the power over final
determinations applies to the judicial department as a whole, not to individual courts).
268. Cf. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 951 (6th Cir. 1998) (Norris, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the inconvenience of meeting the statutory time
limits in the Prison Litigation Reform Act should not render the statute unconstitutional).
The majority reasoning in Hadix was rejected in Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000),
which upheld the statute on other grounds.
269. A statute mandating that the Supreme Court follow its own prior opinions would
be unconstitutional because it would effectively enshrine existing constitutional
jurisprudence in perpetuity. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1596. A statute prohibiting
federal appellate courts from prospectively designating selected opinions as non-precedential
is distinguishable from this type of statute. Because the statute would leave open the
possibility for decisions to be overruled by the court sitting en banc or by the Supreme
Court, it would not enshrine existing jurisprudence on the Constitution or any other area of
law in perpetuity. Moreover, the statute would not require the federal appellate courts to give
binding weight to their own opinions.
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The statute would be analogous to the automatic stay provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act that the Supreme Court upheld in Miller v. French.270 That
Act, which imposes an automatic stay on court orders in prison litigation if district
courts do not rule on pending matters within defined time limits, affects the timing
of judicial decisionmaking, a discretionary matter that has historically been within
the courts' control.271 Congress was concerned, however, that the federal courts
would use this procedural power to avoid applying new substantive standards in
prison litigation, using control over timing to affect the outcome in the case. The
automatic stay provision was designed to circumvent the courts' use of procedure
in this way, but the provision did so in a way that did not direct the outcome of the
case.272 Under that Act, the courts can avoid the imposition of the automatic stay
simply by ruling within the statutory time limit. Even if the automatic stay goes
into effect, it is only temporary until the court rules on the merits273of the case. The
automatic stay has no effect on the ultimate resolution of the case.
A deciding court's designation of the status of its opinion is similar. The
courts' traditional ability to use procedure (control over publication decisions) to
effect at least some prospective control over the precedential value of their opinions
is analogous to their traditional control over the timing of decisions. 274 Eliminating
the federal appellate courts' ability to designate selected opinions prospectively as
non-precedential to avoid the effect of horizontal stare decisis is analogous to
eliminating their ability to use timing delays to avoid applying new substantive
standards. Both are separate from the resolution of the underlying case on the
merits. Like the statute upheld in Miller, a statute prohibiting selective prospective
designation of opinions as non-precedential would not tell the courts "when, how,
or what to do.
Because the statute would not dictate the results in individual cases, control the
courts' interpretation of the law, or require them to issue opinions in any particular
form or manner, it does not usurp the courts' adjudicatory function. Thus, under a
formalist approach, the statute would not violate separation of powers principles
and would be constitutional.

270. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
271. Id. at 340-41.
272. Judge Easterbrook, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, noted
Congress's concern that judges would not apply the Act's new criteria and cited an example
of a judge who opined "that relief should continue for the judge's lifetime." French v.
Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
327 (2000).
273. Miller, 530 U.S. at 346.
274. Courts during the founding era did not feel constrained by precedent the way
courts do today. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 3, at 73-91. The exercise of the discretion to
reject a prior opinion on the applying end, however, must be distinguished from the power to
designate opinions as non-precedential on the deciding end---that is, prospectively. Without
question, applying courts have historically had varying degrees of discretion in determining
which authorities were binding on them. A statute prohibiting prospective designation of
opinions as non-precedential would not affect the courts' ability on the applying end to
decide what is or is not binding on them. See supra notes 258-63 and accompanying text
(explaining that the statute would leave the federal appellate courts free to establish any
constitutional rule of horizontal stare decisis on the applying end of the equation).
275. Miller, 530 U.S. at 346 (quoting the Seventh Circuit's opinion below, Duckworth,
178 F.3d at 449).
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2. Functionalist Analysis
Unlike the formalist approach, the functionalist approach does not turn on
whether Congress attempts to perform a judicial function, Rather, the functionalist
approach evaluates the effect of the statute on the, relative balance of power
between the judicial and legislative branches to determine whether it upsets the
balance sufficiently to create a threat to liberty. It would assess whether the statute
unduly interferes with the federal appellate courts' ability to perform their core
function and whether it risks accumulating too much power in the legislative
branch.276 An analysis of the scope of the statute, the degree to which it leaves
traditional judicial functions with the courts, and the concerns that would motivate
Congress to act shows that the statute would not diminish the judicial power.
Further, the statute would not aggrandize legislative power or create the risk that a
small, identifiable group of individuals would be singled out for oppressive
treatment by the government. Accordingly, the statute would not upset the balance
of power between Congress and the federal courts and would be constitutional
under a functionalist analysis.
One factor the Supreme Court has used in determining the effect of a statute on
the judicial power is its scope. 277 Concededly, the scope of the statute would be
broad. It would affect the roughly 80% of cases that the federal appellate courts
presently designate as non-precedential.278 Thus, as compared with the statute
upheld in Schor, which affected only state law counterclaims arising out of claims
under the Commodity Exchange Act,279 a statute prohibiting selective prospective
designation of opinions as non-precedential would affect many more cases. Viewed
differently, however, the statute would have less of an effect on judicial power than
did the statute at issue in Schor because it would not remove any claim from
consideration by Article III courts. Further, as Mistretta demonstrates, for a statute
to affect a large percentage of cases is not fatal. The sentencing guidelines upheld
in Mistretta affected all criminal cases in the federal courts, which comprise a
significant portion of the docket.280 Thus, although the scope of the statute is one
factor to consider in assessing whether the statute unduly diminishes judicial
power, that factor is not dispositive.
Another factor is the "extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial
power' are reserved to Article III courts. ' 2 1 As long as the statute does not specify
the weight, if any, that the federal appellate courts must accord to their own
opinions, it would not interfere with the courts' core function of deciding cases,

276. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text; see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 851 (1986) (explaining that the Supreme Court evaluates statutes affecting the judiciary
to determine whether they "impermissibly threaten[ I the institutional integrity of the
Judicial Branch").
277. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (explaining that one reason for upholding the
statute was the limited subject matter over which the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission could exercise jurisdiction).
278. See supra note 38.
279. Schor, 478 U.S. at 835.
280. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367-68.
281. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 81 (1982)).
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thus leaving the essential attributes of judicial power with the federal courts. As
discussed above, the statute would not dictate the results in individual cases or
require the courts to interpret the law in a way that Congress prefers. It would leave
the courts in complete control over the rule of horizontal stare decisis. Finally, the
federal appellate courts sitting en banc and the
28 2 Supreme Court would retain the
power to reverse or overrule circuit precedent.
The effect of the statute in this respect echoes the effect of the sentencing
guidelines upheld in Mistretta,283 which transferred substantial discretion to
determine criminal sentences from individual judges to the USSC, an independent
agency within the judicial branch. Similarly, a statute prohibiting prospective
designation of selected opinions as non-precedential would transfer the discretion
to determine the precedential status of an opinion from the panel deciding the case
to a panel applying the case, the latter of which not only has the power to determine
whether the prior case applies to the pending case, but also has the power to make
generally applicable rules of precedent. Because the statute simply shifts discretion
from one part of the judiciary to another, it does not diminish the judicial power.
The statute also leaves the traditional attributes of judicial power with the
courts by leaving the federal appellate courts in complete control of the form and
content of their opinions. 284 This fact defuses the argument that the statute would
interfere with the courts' core function by interfering with docket management.285
Taking away the option of prospectively designating selected opinions as nonprecedential, the argument goes, would require judges to spend so much time
writing opinions that they could not resolve
the number of cases pending before
286
them within a reasonable amount of time.
It is true that an overburdened judiciary cannot be an effective protector of
liberty.287 Nevertheless, it is not clear that eliminating prospective designation of
selected opinions as non-precedential would overburden the judiciary to such a
degree that it could not function properly. This is an empirical question that is
difficult to answer in the abstract. Even under the present system, some nonprecedential opinions are as comprehensive as their precedential counterparts.288
Moreover, the statute would not require the federal appellate courts to issue
comprehensive or even written decisions in every case; control over the form and
content of opinions would leave the courts a range of options for communicating

282. See supra notes 257-69 and accompanying text.
283. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361.
284. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
285. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66-67 (1924).
286. As Judge Alito has explained, one justification for non-precedential opinions is the
judiciary's concern that making all opinions precedential would either reduce the quality of
opinions or impose intolerable burdens on judges in researching and drafting opinions.
Hearings,supra note 3, at 8. "It would be virtually impossible for the courts of appeals to
keep current with their case loads if they attempted to produce such an opinion in every case.
Responsible appellate judges must devote more time to an opinion that changes the law or
clarifies it in an important way (and may thus affect many litigants in future cases) than to an
opinion that simply applies well-established law to specific facts (and thus affects solely the
litigants at hand)." Id.
287. Alfange, Jr., supra note 180, at 693-94.
288. Some non-precedential opinions are "20-page, signed opinions containing
exhaustive legal analysis."

NOVEMBER MEETING,

comments of an unnamed committee member).

supra note 35, at 36 (summarizing
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their decisions if docket management concerns required them to reduce the time
spent writing opinions. Federal rules do require written dispositions for some
matters, but these requirements are rare and apply mostly to district courts.28 9 Thus,
while the statute probably would create some additional work for the courts, it
would not encroach on their core function of deciding cases.
In addition, a third factor the Supreme Court considers in determining whether
a statute impermissibly threatens the judiciary's institutional integrity is the
concern motivating Congress's action. 29 0 The concerns over arbitrary
decisionmaking and judicial legitimacy that non-precedential opinions create are at
least as weighty as the concerns that have justified other legislative initiatives
affecting the judiciary. Although an increase in the number of summary
dispositions would be a possible effect of the statute, Congress could reasonably
determine that that risk is worth taking. As judges acknowledge, non-precedential
opinions do not always reflect the actual reasoning of the courts.29' On one hand,
some explanation of a result, even one that does not contain all of the judges'
reasoning, may be preferable to a one-word disposition. On the other hand, the
issuance of one-word dispositions may be preferable to issuing "non-precedential
opinions that have been joined by judges who may or may not agree with what the
opinions say. 292 A decision that does not reflect the court's actual reasoning could,
in an extreme case, potentially be considered a fraud on the litigants and the public.
Accordingly, Congress's concern over this aspect of non-precedential opinions
justifies the potential risk it creates of increased numbers of summary
dispositions.293
Looking at the other side of the equation, the statute would not increase
Congress's power at the expense of the courts'. Congress would not gain any
power through the statute. Although the statute would eliminate the federal
appellate courts' ability prospectively to designate selected opinions as nonprecedential, it does not substitute a rule of precedent of Congress's choosing in its
place. Like the statute at issue in Schor, a statute prohibiting prospective
opinions as non-precedential would not appreciably expand
designation of selected
294
Congress's power.

Nor does the statute present the risk that concerned Justice Breyer in
group of people will be
concurrence in Plaut: the risk that some small, identifiable29.,
singled out for oppressive treatment by the government. Although some cases

289. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(2) (requiring a district court's denial of motion to
pursue an appeal in forma pauperis to be in writing).
290. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1989); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schorr, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
291. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining
that a non-precedential opinion does not always reflect all of the three panel judges' actual
reasoning); NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that judges join
non-precedential opinions as long as they agree with the result, even if they do not agree
with the reasoning, when they know the opinions will not be precedential).
292. NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 35, at 37 (summarizing comments of unnamed
committee member).
293. Cf Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-66 (explaining Congress's dissatisfaction with
sentencing disparities as one reason for creating the USSC).
294. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57.
295. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 242-43 (1995) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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might be resolved differently if judges cannot ignore earlier cases solely on the
ground that those cases were designated as non-precedential, it is impossible to
identify those cases, or the individuals affected by them, in advance. Thus, no
identifiable group of persons would be targeted for oppressive treatment by the
government under the statute.
The statute would not diminish the power of the judicial branch or interfere
with the federal appellate courts' ability to perform their adjudicatory function, nor
would it risk aggrandizing legislative power at the expense of judicial power. Using
a functionalist approach, therefore, the statute would be constitutional.
C. Is the ProposedRule Eliminating CitationRestrictions Constitutional?
Proposed Rule 32.1, which would prohibit courts from restricting citations to
non-precedential opinions, does not present the same constitutional concerns that a
statute prohibiting non-precedential opinions would. Nevertheless, it merits
analysis because it is the first national rule to attempt to regulate non-precedential
opinions. This rule should pass constitutional muster under either formalist or
functionalist reasoning.
From a formalist perspective, the proposed rule does not usurp the judicial
power. It does not dictate results in cases, nor does it control the courts'
interpretation of the law or require the federal appellate courts to give any weight at
all to non-precedential opinions. 296 Federal appellate courts remain free to ignore
non-precedential opinions solely on the ground that those opinions are not binding.
All the rule does is prohibit courts from restricting citations to non-precedential
opinions unless they impose the same restrictions on citations to precedential
opinions.
The proposed rule would also survive a challenge based on functionalist
analysis, for many of the same reasons justifying a statute prohibiting prospective
designation of selected opinions as non-precedential. The argument that the
proposed rule would impede the courts' ability to perform their core function of
deciding cases would have to be that it would interfere so substantially with the
courts' ability to manage their dockets that it would unduly diminish the judicial
power. Judges may say that the rule will make it harder for them to get through the
docket because they will have to give more attention to their non-precedential
opinions if they know those opinions can be cited later. 297 As noted above,
however, as long as judges retain control over the form and content of their
opinions, the argument that writing citable opinions will be so burdensome for the
courts as to constitute an unconstitutional intrusion on their essential functions is
weak.

296. But see Barnett, supra note 56, at 489-94 (arguing that proposed Rule 32.1 could
be read to affect the weight that federal appellate courts accord to their non-precedential
opinions).
297. See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski).
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CONCLUSION

Judges and lawmakers often assume that the federal courts use judicial power
to promulgate procedural rules. 298 But that is not the case, at least as far as the
national rules are concerned. Because these rules flow from delegated legislative
authority, they cannot be used to regulate matters beyond Congress's legislative
power. In the case of prospective designation of selected opinions as nonprecedential, Congress could prohibit the practice by statute without running afoul
of separation of powers principles as long as the statute did not specify the weight
the federal appellate courts must give to their own opinions. Thus, it would also be
possible to prohibit the practice through a national procedural rule or statute.
Judges would undoubtedly prefer to retain the present system, which gives them
discretion to apply flexible standards, over stricter rules. 299 And they may chafe
over legislative efforts to restrict their discretion. 300 The risk of arbitrary
decisionmaking that the use of non-precedential opinions creates, however, makes
the practice unwise. The courts' unwillingness to change the practice despite this
risk makes a national rule or procedural statute an appropriate vehicle for
addressing the issue. Whether this will happen remains to be seen. If it does, the
Constitution will not stand in the way.

298. See, e.g., id. at 3 (statement of Congressman Howard L. Berman) (noting that
rulemaking is a judicial matter); id. at 15-16 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (stating that the
issue of non-precedential opinions, while capable of resolution through new procedural
rules, is a matter for the courts to resolve).
299. Vermeule, supra note 188, at 390 (explaining that judges prefer standards that
permit the exercise of case-specific judicial discretion over rules).
300. Id. at 360 (characterizing some decisions on separation of powers issues as
displaying "a prickly sensitivity to any slighting of judicial prerogatives"); id. at 391 (noting,
in the context of separation of powers cases, that judges have a strong tendency to equate
tasks that they customarily perform with fundamental judicial functions).

